Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shamekhi; Seyyed Mohammad Reza Hosseini Beheshti
Volume 16, Issue 2 , March 2019, , Pages 63-85
Abstract
This article investigates the necessity of a Leibnizian re-interpretation of Aristotelian theory of change. Substance-seeking attitude in Aristotle’s philosophy of nature has ...
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This article investigates the necessity of a Leibnizian re-interpretation of Aristotelian theory of change. Substance-seeking attitude in Aristotle’s philosophy of nature has been by no means something uncertain or shrouded in doubt, but its prominence and its aspects and consequences are better laid bare when seen in the light of Leibnizian Monadology. Briefly the claim is that some Aristotelian remarks and theories should be amended and some falsified if the immanency of substance is to be taken seriously. The paradigm of this immanency is the Leibnizian conception of metaphysical substance or monad. Monadological approach, deeming any influence from without impossible, bases the explanation solely on the spontaneity and immanency of substance. Thus Having had been imprisoned in the labyrinth of Aristotelian physics – esp. in the concepts of dynamis, physis, entelechia and energeia, in the distinction between the mover and the moved and in the differentiation between natural and artificial beings -, the Minotaur eventually escaped the maze and now is clearly discernable: It is nothing but “Being as Unfolding”. Historically and genealogically this article hardly bears anything noteworthy or informative, since the emphasis is on a philosophical reappraisal, and not just an interpretation, of Aristotelian theory of change. Sometimes being Aristotelian requires saying “nay!” to Aristotle.
