Philosophy2008-155345220171222Principles of Demonstration and the State of Nous: Knowledge of universals in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II,19Principles of Demonstration and the State of Nous: Knowledge of universals in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II,191226773910.22059/jop.2018.259956.1006368FAZeinabAnsary Najafabadydepartment of philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Human Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranSeyed MohammadrezaHosseini BeheshtiDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Human Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20170813Accept: After constructing a demonstrative system, Aristotle concludes Posterior Analytics by asking question about premises of demonstration based on principles that are primitive, necessary and can’t be proved by demonstration itself. These principles are propositions about universal concepts and are necessary, since the predicate arises from subject, the universal concept. Therefore, knowing these first principle is the same as knowing the universals. Anyway how they become known and what is the developed state of knowledge of them? In other words, what is the ground that the whole demonstration system stands on it? To answer these questions, Aristotle describes the way the soul proceeds to know universals and calls the highest degree of process of knowing “Nous”, the state of knowing the first principles. But Aristotle’s phrases in this text are so ambiguous that leads to different interpretations. This paper first considers the context of the problem in Aristotle’s epistemology and then criticizes these interpretations, so it becomes clear that the validity of each interpretation is tied to the problem of “nous poietikos” or the so-called “active intellect”. But the analysis of Aristotle’s account of active intellect shows us the notable similarities of these interpretations, not their fundamental contrasts <br /> Accept: After constructing a demonstrative system, Aristotle concludes Posterior Analytics by asking question about premises of demonstration based on principles that are primitive, necessary and can’t be proved by demonstration itself. These principles are propositions about universal concepts and are necessary, since the predicate arises from subject, the universal concept. Therefore, knowing these first principle is the same as knowing the universals. Anyway how they become known and what is the developed state of knowledge of them? In other words, what is the ground that the whole demonstration system stands on it? To answer these questions, Aristotle describes the way the soul proceeds to know universals and calls the highest degree of process of knowing “Nous”, the state of knowing the first principles. But Aristotle’s phrases in this text are so ambiguous that leads to different interpretations. This paper first considers the context of the problem in Aristotle’s epistemology and then criticizes these interpretations, so it becomes clear that the validity of each interpretation is tied to the problem of “nous poietikos” or the so-called “active intellect”. But the analysis of Aristotle’s account of active intellect shows us the notable similarities of these interpretations, not their fundamental contrasts <br /> Philosophy2008-155345220171222The Structural Unity between Time and the Transcendental Ego in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.The Structural Unity between Time and the Transcendental Ego in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.23436774110.22059/jop.2018.225507.1006262FAAhmadRajabiPhd tehran universityJournal Article20170120Abstract: In this paper, the fundamental role of time in the possibility of the synthesis of the two sides of synthetic a priori judgment or pure synthesis, i.e. the pure intuition and the pure concept, will be discussed, in order to reveal the structural unity between them based on their common ground. The possibility of the pure synthesis indicates the possibility of unifying time as the pure comprehensive intuition on the one hand and pure Ego as the transcendental unity of apperception on the other. The unity of apperception on its part is the ground of the unity of all concepts of the understanding. The transcendental imagination unifies pure intuition and pure concept, thus the sought structural unity appears in the structure of the transcendental imagination as the mediation between receptivity of the intuition and spontaneity of the understanding. We attempt in this paper to disclose the possibility of this mediation and thus – with reference to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian transcendental imagination - the original and unspoken structural unity between time and the transcendental Ego on the basis of the fundamental structure of pure intuition of time as self-affection or spontaneous receptivity. According to this structure, Kant’s transcendental philosophy can be founded on the subjectivity of finite subjectAbstract: In this paper, the fundamental role of time in the possibility of the synthesis of the two sides of synthetic a priori judgment or pure synthesis, i.e. the pure intuition and the pure concept, will be discussed, in order to reveal the structural unity between them based on their common ground. The possibility of the pure synthesis indicates the possibility of unifying time as the pure comprehensive intuition on the one hand and pure Ego as the transcendental unity of apperception on the other. The unity of apperception on its part is the ground of the unity of all concepts of the understanding. The transcendental imagination unifies pure intuition and pure concept, thus the sought structural unity appears in the structure of the transcendental imagination as the mediation between receptivity of the intuition and spontaneity of the understanding. We attempt in this paper to disclose the possibility of this mediation and thus – with reference to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian transcendental imagination - the original and unspoken structural unity between time and the transcendental Ego on the basis of the fundamental structure of pure intuition of time as self-affection or spontaneous receptivity. According to this structure, Kant’s transcendental philosophy can be founded on the subjectivity of finite subjectPhilosophy2008-155345220180319An analysis of the ratio of modernity to the genesis of the uneventful world from the point of view of Heidegger's philosophyAn analysis of the ratio of modernity to the genesis of the uneventful world from the point of view of Heidegger's philosophy45606774210.22059/jop.2018.248701.1006324FAAliRasouliFaculty of Social Sciences, University of TehranMahdiHoseinzadehFaculty of Social Sciences, University of TehranJournal Article20171207Abstract: The modern times approach is the same as Aristotle has written in the fourth book of physics: ((The 'now' is the link of time)). While Heidegger believes this understanding of time, puts the being as something present at hand for Manipulation, because the being is in now Discrete from the past and the future, and it seems that its totality is available for to be dominated. As a result of this process being is not able to revealing and uneventful world is embodied. However, in Heidegger's philosophy, something must have happened before thinking and acting in a genuine and meaningful way. But, Heidegger's suggestion for to get out of this problematic situation (uneventful world), is not the prescription of a struggle, but the abandonment of things to oneself as they are. Heidegger expresses this abandonment with the term "Gelassenheit". Some researchers from Heidegger's term "Gelassenheit" concluded some kind of inaction and numbness. However, in the present study, we will show that "Gelassenheit" is not space neutral and inaction arena, But also is itself involves activism, But at the time it belongs, The present time that is realm of past and future confluence, And Heidegger calls it the name "genuine moment", a determined moment that should be expected, And when it happened, identified the hidden event in it. The term "Gelassenheit" suggests a delayed process and thus, in the face of the objectification process in modernity. <br /> Abstract: The modern times approach is the same as Aristotle has written in the fourth book of physics: ((The 'now' is the link of time)). While Heidegger believes this understanding of time, puts the being as something present at hand for Manipulation, because the being is in now Discrete from the past and the future, and it seems that its totality is available for to be dominated. As a result of this process being is not able to revealing and uneventful world is embodied. However, in Heidegger's philosophy, something must have happened before thinking and acting in a genuine and meaningful way. But, Heidegger's suggestion for to get out of this problematic situation (uneventful world), is not the prescription of a struggle, but the abandonment of things to oneself as they are. Heidegger expresses this abandonment with the term "Gelassenheit". Some researchers from Heidegger's term "Gelassenheit" concluded some kind of inaction and numbness. However, in the present study, we will show that "Gelassenheit" is not space neutral and inaction arena, But also is itself involves activism, But at the time it belongs, The present time that is realm of past and future confluence, And Heidegger calls it the name "genuine moment", a determined moment that should be expected, And when it happened, identified the hidden event in it. The term "Gelassenheit" suggests a delayed process and thus, in the face of the objectification process in modernity. <br /> Philosophy2008-155345220180319A Criticism of Theories of Meaning in Analytic Philosophy of ArtA Criticism of Theories of Meaning in Analytic Philosophy of Art61836774410.22059/jop.2018.239378.1006298FAMehdiShamsPhD candidate, Department of philosophy, Faculty of literature and human sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranMohammadMeshkatAssociate Professor of philosophy, Department of philosophy, Faculty of literature and human sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20170807 <br />Variations of different theories in analytic philosophy of art have caused long debates about literary interpretation. Intentionalism and anti-intentionalism are the two main avenues and theorists have developed different positions, which lean towards each of the two. Along with the arguments for or against the link between the authorial intentions and the literary text, a question could be asked of different parties of the debate, that is, how the meaning of a piece of literature is constituted. In other words, how the meaning of a poem or a novel takes its shape? In this regard, I think, concentrating on the philosophy of language and theories of meaning would be much helpful. It seems to me that for answering this question one needs to withdraw from a Gricean theory of meaning. I argue that neither intentionalists nor anti-intentionalist, do not answer this question deftly. I will try to investigate some answers given to this question by two moderate intentionalists, Robert Stecker and Paisley Livingston, in order to show in which respects their answers are problematic. At last, I argue that Relevance Theory, developed by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, could answer this question in a way that dissolves some of the hard cases in the philosophy of interpretation. <br />Variations of different theories in analytic philosophy of art have caused long debates about literary interpretation. Intentionalism and anti-intentionalism are the two main avenues and theorists have developed different positions, which lean towards each of the two. Along with the arguments for or against the link between the authorial intentions and the literary text, a question could be asked of different parties of the debate, that is, how the meaning of a piece of literature is constituted. In other words, how the meaning of a poem or a novel takes its shape? In this regard, I think, concentrating on the philosophy of language and theories of meaning would be much helpful. It seems to me that for answering this question one needs to withdraw from a Gricean theory of meaning. I argue that neither intentionalists nor anti-intentionalist, do not answer this question deftly. I will try to investigate some answers given to this question by two moderate intentionalists, Robert Stecker and Paisley Livingston, in order to show in which respects their answers are problematic. At last, I argue that Relevance Theory, developed by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, could answer this question in a way that dissolves some of the hard cases in the philosophy of interpretation.Philosophy2008-155345220180319Analyzing the Highest and Worst Moral Attributes from the Perspective of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Khajeh Nasir-al-Din Tusi.Analyzing the Highest and Worst Moral Attributes from the Perspective of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Khajeh Nasir-al-Din Tusi.851036774510.22059/jop.2018.67745FAMasoudSadeghiabc0000-0001-9733-3300Journal Article20180117Aristotle, Aquinas, and Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi are representatives of the three periods and the worlds of thought, and all of them have played an important role in establishing or consolidating their ethical attitudes. In this essay, it was attempted to identify and analyze the highest virtues and the worst ethical vices from the perspective of each of these three wise and expert philosophers. For Aristotle, the highest virtue is justice and greed and the worst vice is oppression to friends. For Aquinas considers Caritas as the highest virtue of and the worst vice is the disappointment. Khajeh Naseer regards grace as the supreme ethical attribute and stinging as the worst, although envy and anger can also be considered as the worst vice in a rather vague interpretation. Comparing the results of the work, firstly, suggests that the views of Khajeh Nasir and Aquinas are close to each other, and secondly, Aristotle's has more sophisticated view to ethics and ethical virtues than two other thinkers.Aristotle, Aquinas, and Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi are representatives of the three periods and the worlds of thought, and all of them have played an important role in establishing or consolidating their ethical attitudes. In this essay, it was attempted to identify and analyze the highest virtues and the worst ethical vices from the perspective of each of these three wise and expert philosophers. For Aristotle, the highest virtue is justice and greed and the worst vice is oppression to friends. For Aquinas considers Caritas as the highest virtue of and the worst vice is the disappointment. Khajeh Naseer regards grace as the supreme ethical attribute and stinging as the worst, although envy and anger can also be considered as the worst vice in a rather vague interpretation. Comparing the results of the work, firstly, suggests that the views of Khajeh Nasir and Aquinas are close to each other, and secondly, Aristotle's has more sophisticated view to ethics and ethical virtues than two other thinkers.Philosophy2008-155345220180319The Problem of Generality of “object in general”: A Consideration on The idea of a transcendental logicThe Problem of Generality of “object in general”: A Consideration on The idea of a transcendental logic1051286774610.22059/jop.2018.249252.1006326FAMajidMoraditheranSeyyed HamidTalebzadehAssociate Professor,University of TehranJournal Article20180113 <br />Abstract: Here, I will introduce a totality of a view about “the concept of an object in general” in the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to do so, I will articulate an article under the title of Generality of Kant’s transcendental logic since the article has presented the view adequately and in an uninterrupted way. Alongside with this articulation, I will purpose a consideration about this totality: As we will see, the fundamental characteristic of the totality of this view is to concentrate on determining the status of “transcendental logic sensu stricto” as (1) a necessarily “non-formal logic” that (2) still stays “universal”. Thus, transcendental logic can be proposed as a transcendental “universal ontology” which its subject matter is “the concept of an object in general”. based on this view, in order to set these two conditions, we must abstract transcendental logic from any relation to any level of “transcendental aesthetics in general” and “intuition in general”. The hint to this abstraction is the principle that “transcendental logic sensu stricto” can only be achieved at the level of “reason in general” and any reference to the level of “critique” of “reason in general” would already dysfunction the transcendental logic itself. Through a consideration, I will attempt to discuss this subject that to what extent the abovementioned view, with its omitting of the level of “critique of pure reason” from transcendental logic, stays loyal to “the idea of a transcendental logic” in Critique of Pure Reason. <br />Abstract: Here, I will introduce a totality of a view about “the concept of an object in general” in the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to do so, I will articulate an article under the title of Generality of Kant’s transcendental logic since the article has presented the view adequately and in an uninterrupted way. Alongside with this articulation, I will purpose a consideration about this totality: As we will see, the fundamental characteristic of the totality of this view is to concentrate on determining the status of “transcendental logic sensu stricto” as (1) a necessarily “non-formal logic” that (2) still stays “universal”. Thus, transcendental logic can be proposed as a transcendental “universal ontology” which its subject matter is “the concept of an object in general”. based on this view, in order to set these two conditions, we must abstract transcendental logic from any relation to any level of “transcendental aesthetics in general” and “intuition in general”. The hint to this abstraction is the principle that “transcendental logic sensu stricto” can only be achieved at the level of “reason in general” and any reference to the level of “critique” of “reason in general” would already dysfunction the transcendental logic itself. Through a consideration, I will attempt to discuss this subject that to what extent the abovementioned view, with its omitting of the level of “critique of pure reason” from transcendental logic, stays loyal to “the idea of a transcendental logic” in Critique of Pure Reason.