Orientalism and Beyond:

Towards a Study of the "Other" in the Middle East Anthropology

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Abstract

This paper is a review of the concept of Orientalism (1) and its consequences for anthropological study of the Middle East. The term Orientalism denotes a certain perception of "the East" (the Middle East) by "the West", or Europe and America, that is essentialist and ahistorical, and covers "all endeavors to establish the Orient as an object of knowledge and domination" (Said 1978:2). The concept is most often associated with Edward Said's book of the same name, and has been part of a robust debate among anthropologists and other social scientists concerning their perceptions and methods of studying other cultures. I will explore the debate as it has progressed, and look at some of the implications for Middle East anthropology. There will be three main sections of this paper. First, I will review the criticism of Orientalism by several scholars, up to and including Said. Next, I will assess the ensuing debate over the concept, as it was incorporated into social science discourse. Finally, I will explore Orientalism in the broader context of cross-cultural studies, and the underlying dichotomies of "We/They" and "Self/Other". As this organizational scheme suggests, I believe that the discourse of social science has undergone an evolution, gaining in both complexity and substance. Said's book has been an important contribution to anthropological debate because it organized and exposed biases and attitudes that had long been a part of Western ideologies, and presented them in a thorough, popular volume. Since the book's publication, faults have been found in Said's scholarship, and attitudes in general have changed almost as fast as events in the Middle East have. But Said certainly wasn't the first to expose Orientalism, and I will first examine the initial recognition of Orientalist thinking.

Key words: orientalism, anthropology, the other, self, culture.

Introduction

Studying "other cultures" has long been seen as problematic, and the concern spans the entire history of the the social sciences. Max Weber was a pioneer in many aspects of social theory, and as Benjamin Nelson

(1976) has observed, he was one of the first social scientists to recognize prevailing Eurocentric views about "the East" and see the dichotomy being cultivated, though he wasn't free of such views himself. Nelson acknowledges his own "avowedly civilizational point of view" in his essay. He focuses on several of Weber's works, but mainly *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion* and *Economy and Society*. In the former, Weber stressed that the West could only be understood in its historical context, which includes its relations with its Oriental neighbors. The latter study is more sociological than historical, but elaborates further the dichotomy between East and West. Nelson is concerned with the "generally unnoticed foundations" in Weber's work which underlie the East/West dichotomy. These include the dualisms of the "brother" or "insider" versus the "alien", "enemy" or "outsider"; and that of "religion versus world" or "innerworldly aceticism" versus "otherworldly aceticism." Nelson asserts that "otherworldly" asceticism was overcome by "innerworldly" in the West, "and in the West alone," with the aid of the "Protestant Ethic" (his emphasis). He goes on to say that the East didn't overcome its "irrationality" until the West brought its "rationality" there. (Nelson 1976:117) Throughout the essay, Nelson ponders over the "apparent failure of [the East] to achieve breakthroughs to modern capitalist organization" and in so doing, appears to fall squarely among the Orientalists himself. Nevertheless, Nelson does make some interesting observations about Weber. *Economy and Society*, he says, "marks a decisive turn in the way Weber thought about the relations between East and West", through his use of the concept of "fraternization". This notion of brotherhood stemmed from the intersection of the Greek, Roman and Jewish-Christian cultures, and was key in the formation of the "distinctive Occidental city." (Nelson 1976:119)

Weber's own observations about the Eastern cultures he studied were historically both general and specific. Generally, he perceived the institutional and cultural structures "which notably influenced the West," as well as "countervailing influences that have had a part in slowing the transformative breakthroughs of the East." Most importantly, Weber noted the "complex structures of rationalizations and rationalisms which developed in the West." (Nelson 1976:121) Such events he discussed in their specific historical context, an important aspect too often ignored or overlooked by his contemporaries. But some of Weber's generalizations are more simplistic than they are useful, such as his comparisons of China to modern France, and modern India to ancient Greece. He contrasted the "sensual" East with the "rational" West, where denial of luxury was

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upheld by the Protestant church. It was for these very reasons that Said characterized Weber as having blown "into the very territory charted and claimed by the Orientalists." (Said 1978:259) Though Weber never studied Islam in much depth, Said charges that his studies of religion, and particularly his notions of the "ideal type", served to confirm many of his contemporaries' Orientalist cliches. Also, as Bryan Turner has observed, Weber argued that the Arab world was marked by despotic political structures, the absence of autonomous cities and distinct classes, and a continual decline since the days of "classical Islam". His internalist theory of development blamed Islam for the failure of the Middle East to generate capitalism. But Turner also notes Weber's positive contributions, such as his useful theory of the political economy of Mideast societies. (Turner 1978:7) In general, Weber's insight into the East/West dichotomy was valuable, but also as revealing of Weber's research setting as it was of the man.

Criticism of biased Oriental studies arose with the decolonization of Middle East states in the early decades of this century. Baber Johansen (1990) has divided the critique into three stages, which I will follow. The first stage developed in the late 1950s and early 60s as Oriental Studies departments in the US, USSR and UK were reorganized. As the European powers pulled out of the Middle East, the US began to fill the vacuum, and its government needed experts on the region, so began funding Middle East studies departments; (previously, such study was mainly confined to religious studies departments). (see Ismael & Ismael 1990) This concurred with the trend in anthropology for more refined methods and studies that were cross-culturally communicable. The second phase of the critique began in 1963 with the publication of an article by Anouar Abdel-Malek. Abdel-Malek, an Egyptian intellectual and former communist, attacked the notion of "the Orient and Orientals as an 'object' of study, stamped with an otherness, of an essential character." He noticed the prevailing

> essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology.É One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in

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direct relationship with non-European peoples. (Abdel-Malek 1963:107)

Abdel-Malek charged that the collapse of colonialism exposed the fallacy of Orientalists: they construed the Orient in terms of ahistorical, metaphysical essentialism, mostly experiencing it from religious and historical texts, and in so doing they transformed the Orient into an alienated object of knowledge and domination. As a solution, he proposed more specialized disciplines that could apply to both the Orient and Occident, which would make the humanities more universal. Abdel-Malek's article "carried the anticolonial struggle into the field of scholarly production of knowledge and images," as Johansen says (1990:72), but unfortunately it was mostly Arab scholars who heard his call, at first.

The criticism gained momentum in the 60s and 70s. In a paper presented at a 1976 conference Abdel-Malek (1977) again addressed the issue. The paper summarizes the previous methodologies for studying the Middle East, from Weber's "idealtypus" approach; to neo-Marxist approaches in which the West is often the "center" and the Orient the "periphery"; to contemporary approaches studying crises of development, such as hunger, energy, ecological and economic balance. Abdel-Malek saw, at the time, a blending of materialistic and humanistic approaches, but the result of which was socioeconomic and humanistic reductionism. The developmentalists, he charged, see the Orient as "'lagging behind,' 'bridging the gap,' or 'overtaking' (hopefully)". (Abdel-Malek 1977:59) He cites Arnold Toynbee and Joseph Needham as signaling "the crisis of Western civilization and the rise of the Orient.... Yet it is striking to see that no attempt yet is being made to promote a civilizational and cultural revival of the West". (Arabs, on the other hand, view their recent accelerated development as a "renaissance", not "autonomy", "independence" or "modernization", he notes.) The developmentalists view Western hegemony in the Mideast, he says, as solely economic, with infrastructure and superstructure seen as isolated, separate phenomena. And to the same end, Eastern intellectuals have been encouraged to study Occidental culture, "to recognize its eminence and unique quality, to comprehend the formative influence of the socio-cultural pattern upon the transformation of science and technology." (Abdel-Malek 1977:60) In presenting his own approach to Mideast study, Abdel-Malek stresses that "at the heart of the matter, lies the organic interrelation between *power* and *culture*" (his emphasis). He argues for Pharaonic Egypt, Persia, the Indian Mogul empire, the Islamic empire and others to be accorded the same hegemonic status as Europe. "In short,

never in history have we witnessed power without culture," he says, echoing Michel ́ Foucault. (Abdel-Malek 1977:60) Abdel-Malek's characterization of Orientalism is still the most accurate, and served as the point of departure for Said. (Said 1978:97)

During the 70s, another Arab scholar providing important criticism was Samir Amin. He draws from Marxist concepts, yet argues the need for "deep theoretical revisions" of them, especially when applied to the Arab world. (Amin 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1978a, 1978b, 1980) Amin states that "bourgeouis social thought" (like Weber's) assumes that the constant change of productive forces in capitalism made it appear as the ultimate form of "Reason". This Enlightenment idea holds social laws as equal to "natural laws," and offer Europe's history as the consummate model of universal history, he says. Hence "bourgeouis social thought is at best eurocentric, materialistic and linear.... The evolution of economic thought...bears this out."

Economic domination by Europe, then the U.S., led to the main manifestation of such an ideology: "economicism." (Amin 1978a:88) As an example, he cites the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, which, when compared to European modes, is always classified as inferior. (Amin 1978a:90) As an alternative, Amin offers his "unequal development" theory, wherein changes in modes of production are seen to begin not in the center, but on the peripheries, "amongst the weak links of the system." This hypothesis views all modes of production as universal rather than successive, and holds that societies can jump from one mode to another, passing over others. Amin also proposes a "tributary mode of production" to replace the Asiatic mode, as the most general type of pre-capitalist system. It focuses on relations of domination and exploitation, with slavery and feudalism seen as peripheral forms. Ancient China and Egypt are viewed as having mature tributary modes. Amin sees his brand of historical materialism as truly universal, easily applied to any society, though he personally has a regional perspective.

> Historical materialism is meaningful only if it supplies
> us with concepts which help us to grasp the processes
> whereby societies -- any and all societies -- are
> transformed in their essential respects. The unity of a
> region or of a period by no means always seems
> obvious to those who live in it: it is only afterwards

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> that this unity can be seen in the action of the dominant
> tendencies. (Amin 1978a:92)

His regional perspective has proven valuable for studying the development, structure and shifting of centers of power.

Many other scholars offered critiques of Orientalism throughout the 1960s and 70s, such as Talal Asad (1973) and Maxime Rodinson (1968).(2) This was part of a general "intellectual revolution", as I will explore later. For Middle East studies, the year 1978 was a turning point. That year saw the publication of two publications with an almost identical formulation of the concept, Said's *Orientalism* and Brian Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, as well as a ground-breaking conference on indigenous anthropology.

Said's book marks the third phase of the critique. *Orientalism* was written in 1975 and 1976, after Said had "been reading about Orientalism for a number of years." (Said 1978:xi) Said's work is the best known to non-academics, perhaps because his approach was less explicitly influenced by Marx and other theorists long stigmatized in the US; because he was perceived as less "militant" (though in fact his work is perhaps the most political); because he had more access to American universities and media; and because *Orientalism* presented the issue in a comprehensible, well-organized and well-publicized volume which was subsequently translated into several languages. (By contrast, Abdel-Malek's "L'Orientalisme" has never been translated.)

Said's aim was to discuss Orientalism within Foucault's model of discourse, in order to "say that we can better understand the persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were *productive*, not unilaterally inhibiting" (Said 1978:14; his emphasis) But unlike Abdel-Malek and Amin, Said wrote from the perspective of a Palestinian living in the West, and he is more polemical. He notes that there is an important distinction between European and American views toward the Mideast. In both Europe and the U.S., "passion, prejudice and political interests" have been the context in which the Middle East is viewed, Said says. But several European countries have had colonies there, hence direct contact; some, notably France, also have sizable Muslim populations. By contrast, the US has had little contact with the Arab world until relatively recently, either from colonial relations or immigrants, and the region has mostly been discussed only in crisis-

oriented matters. This has been combined with "modernization theory" in which the Islamic world is seen as "in a kind of timeless childhood" until the US came along. (Said 1983:23) Said encourages research on "Occidentalism" among near Eastern scholars to counter the phenomenon.

Turner's book uncannily characterizes Orientalism in the same way, almost in the same words. Perhaps it's not surprising, since the elements had been flung out into the realm of discourse -- albeit rather randomly -- by Abdel-Malek, Amin and others. It's possible that the two were in contact with eachother, but neither acknowledges the other. The main difference between the two is the way each presented his findings: Said holding up the concept in a colorfully packaged book, written for a wide audience and published by a major US firm; Turner pairing his version with the theorist most demonized in the US, in a rather plain volume written for a small cadre of academics, published by a small London house.

Turner's thesis is no less admirable, though. Like Amin, he believes Marxism can demolish Orientalism and transform other models (such as Weberian patrimonialism or the "mosaic" model of the Middle East) into "proper objects of theoretical work," (Turner 1978:82) but not without some revisions. Although concepts like the Asiatic mode of production and patrimonialism were developed specifically for studying the Middle East, he says, they lack an indigenous understanding and therefore fail in their analysis. So too with Durkheimian sociology, the favored method of Middle Eastern sociologists. Marxism is further stigmatized in the region, he notes, because the remarks made by Marx and Engels justified colonialism: Marx, like Weber, believed that the Middle East was either in perpetual stasis due to authoritarianism and despotism, or in a slow decline since the time of Mohammed.

But Turner believes that a revised Marxist model holds the best prospect for correcting past fallacies. The "auto-critiquing" feature of Marxist analysis is the key. (In fact, he turns this tactic on himself, admitting that his own earlier work on Islam bears the mark of Weberian Orientalism; the present study, he says, is an exercise in "personal decolonisation".) (Turner 1978:9) But revisions are needed, such as the elimination of "teleological versions of Marxism which, for example, treat history as a series of necessary stages and thereby relegate the Middle East to a stage prior to 'real history';" (Turner 1978:8) and the center/periphery concept,

for "once the centers were established, the conditions for development on the preipheries were fundamentally changed". (Turner 1978:81)

Since publication of the two books, and mainly as a result of Said's, the Orientalism concept -- having been exposed, organized and tightly compacted into a single, readily understandable word -- has been applied to a diverse range of topics, such as Islamic law (Powers 1989), the control of women (Nader 1989), Islamic fundamentalism (Abaza & Stauth 1988), and a wide range of literariture, poetry and art. But the very reception of the book -- the intense debate it generated -- confirms Johansen's belief that it marked an important turning point in Middle East studies and in the social sciences in general. I will now examine the development of the debate, beginning with some of Said's critics.

Evolution of the Orientalism Debate

The first, most striking and perhaps least surprising criticism came from the American Jewish community. Because of Said's Palestinian views, Trinity College in Connecticut received several letters of protest from Jewish faculty and the local Jewish community when Said was to give a lecture there, shortly after the publication of *Orientalism*. Some even said his very presence was an insult to Holocaust survivors. The protest was unsuccessful and the lecure was held, but there was an attempt to hold funds for a a chair in Jewish studies afterward; the college doubted it would invite Said back. (Ismael & Ismael 1990:12)

Most of Said's critics have voiced their thoughts in print. An early critique by Amal Rassam (1979) claimed that Said failed to fully discuss Christianity as a cause of Orientalism. Rassam says there are two contradictory heritages of Orientalism, "one rational, scientific and panhumanist, the other racist, paranoid and isolationist," based on Chrisitan mistrust and fear of "Moslem barbarians". (p. 505)

Rassam, (like Said "an Oriental now living in the West") also notes that if Said would have included the Maghreb in his analysis, he would have "added some interesting and potent evidence to his central thesis in the form of the French experience in Algeria and Morocco." (p. 506) Generally, Rassam wonders why Said believes "most advanced cultures have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialsim, racism and ethnocentrism," yet he singles out Europe. Contrary to Foucaultian discourse, Said "is judging Europe not in terms of its own historical reality and intellectual development, but in terms of the claims it makes

for itself as the arbitor and guardian of humanity's highest values." Moreover, Rassam charges, Said fails to offer alternatives to Orientalism (p. 508).

Ross Chambers (1979) took the critique a step further, pointing out the dual nature of Orientalism:

> A book which indicates, as his does, that "Western" representations of the East (beginning with the notion of the East itself) have purposes which relate to purely Western needs and projects can be seen in its turn as a representation of Orientalism having purposes of its own, such as the furtherance of Arab political causes. A review which points these things out is itself asking to be reviewed in terms of its own representations and purposes. And so on (p. 509).

I might add that my review of Chambers' review of Said's review of the West's review of the East is just adding one more layer of representation; this is what Daniel Boorstin (1961) calls the "review of reviewers," each one a step further from reality. But rather than adding confusion, I hope that this process is serving the goals of Foucaultian discourse, that is, trying to unearth knowledge that has been covered over. In general, Chambers praises the book:

> No academic reader of Said can fail to ask themselves some searching questions about their own disciplines and the interests they serve. As a teacher of French literature, for example, I can see that my work meshes nicely with the purposes of France's famous *mission civilizatrice...* (p. 511)

Baber Johansen (1990), in the context of his review of Oriental studies in Germany, notes many important shortcomings in Said's work. He says that in contrast to Abdel-Malek, Said is "neither optimistic nor universal in scope," (p. 72) and rightly notes that this is partly due to each one's historical context: there were profound changes in the Middle East between 1963 and 1978. Johansen also charges that *Orientalism* "has no clearly delineated object of study and... its author -- in a very Orientalist tradition -- does not always apply the methods he borrows from other scholars (e.g., Foucault's concept of discourse) in the way these scholars would have used them." (p. 73) Johansen most importantly targets the

book's paradox that it holds up the field of Oriental studies as responsible for Orientalism: he says Said

> helps to ease the burden of a guilt complex concerning the ethnocentrism, racism, and imperialism inherent in much of Western culture, political systems, scholarship, and everyday practice. Said's book offers a scapegoat on which this guilt can be projected, which can then be expelled into the desert carrying all the vices with it, leaving behind the general public and all other disciplines, political systems, and practices in a state of newly recovered innocence.... In other words, Said replaces the critique of imperialism with the critique of Orientalism. (p. 73)

This is true: Said explicitly states (1978:322) that he doesn't lament that the Arab world has become a U.S. satellite. Another critic, Sadiq al-Azm, (in Johansen 1990:73) made similar charges, saying that by failing to compare Oriental studies with other disciplines, Said is practicing "inverted Orientalism".

The same year as the publication of Said's and Turner's important works, 1978, there was a symposium to explore "Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries" which at the time was a "working concept". (Fahim 1982) Biased Western anthropology wasn't the only motivation for the symposium, there were several other factors: The countries where Western anthropologists had been working were now developing and politically sensitive, and many countries now set restrictions on foreign anthropologists while encouraging indigenous ones; Western anthropologists were beginning to do fieldwork within their own countries (see below); and Western anthropologists were becoming more steeped in methodology and theory debates and were doing less fieldwork in general. (Fahim 1982:xii)

Various constructive developments came out of the symposium, and two broad orientations were agreed upon: (1) Social and personal bias should be overcome through critical self-awareness and methodological rigor; and (2) Western concepts which distort reality (like Orientalism) should be questioned, redefined and rejected if necessary. (Fahim 1982:xiii) Many problems also emerged. One anthropologist, for example, recalled the experience of leaving her native Saudi Arabia to receive graduate training in Berkeley. Upon returning home to study her own class, sect,

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religion and nationality, she found that the Western attitudes she had acquired clouded her unique "native" perspective. Only after much self-reflection and working time in Saudi Arabia did she reorganize her initial data in a way she felt was more valid. (Fahim 1982:xiv)

Meanwhile, American anthropologists turned their lens more on their own culture, and an example will illustrate the parallels with "Third World" indigenous fieldwork. I refer to James Spradley's (1970) study of "urban nomads" in Seattle, as discussed by Nader. (1988:151) Indigenous ethnographies like this are especially political because they are written for their informants, not just about them; and like many "third world" indigenous studies, they are designed to influence policy and bring about change. (Spradley called the type "Public Interest Ethnography".) Such work may be executed with admirable intentions, Nader notes, but without self-reflexivity it can be rather harmful. Spradley's, she says, led to "the change from legal to medical treatment of public drunks and thereby [moved] their status from defendents for whom their could be legal advocacy because they have legal rights, to patients who would be 'treated'". (p. 151) Despite this, some very important American ethnography is being done, and isn't limited to disenfranchised groups. Studies of the cultures of science and academia (for example, Furner 1975) are a very important part of anthropology.

Indigenous "Third World" anthropology seems like a contradiction, since anthropology itself developed in the West and carries its own inherent biases. But it can be adapted to other frameworks, which is the strength of anthropology, and indeed many frameworks have been built and destroyed over the discipline's entire history. At the 1978 symposium, a distinction was made between "indigenous" and "native" anthropology: the latter refers to an anthropologist of the same ethnic group as his/her informants, not just the same country. Overall, indigenous anthropology is a positive development in contrast to Orientalism. But care should be taken to see that it accounts for nonlocal elements as well, for it could be seen how easily a false dichotomy can be created; a failure to consider global historical context can result in a "North/South" opposition to replace the now-shattered "East/West" one. (The terms "Third World" and "non-Western" are both culturally loaded and suggest a dichotomy where there is, increasingly, not one. Perhaps some new categorizations are due.) The sudden infusion of money for such studies, such as "oil money" in the Persian Gulf region, can easily distort priorities.

In the Arab world, despite the infusion of indigenous anthropologists, the scholarly work generated there "has had a very limited influence on international academic discourse even when it directly concerns the region" as Seteney Shami (1989) says. The reason, Shami states, lies in the nature of the relations between the Arab world and the West. Indigenous universities have existed for a millenium in the Mideast, but Western-style universities predominate today. Islamic scholarship abounds but is "marginalized in many spheres." (p. 649) After the oil boom, many universities aimed to turn out specialized individuals for particular jobs. As for anthropology, it is often incorporated within sociology departments at Middle Eastern universities, and Durkheim's theories, born in the West and validated by international development agencies, have become popular. As a result, there is much development-related research. The quality of anthropology education, Shami notes, is low. This is due to a lack of monographs in Arabic, and foreign language training is not encouraged. Graduates rarely teach, and instead work as consultants or researchers, or go to universities in the West.

Anthropology's identification with colonization causes ideological debates between universities, which often result in a rejection of the field on the grounds that it threatens national heritage and identity. Arab identity is often seen as rising out of Islamic heritage and not folk traditions, and it's not uncommon for book publishers to reject monographs because they fail to contribute to Arab identity. In Shami's view, "The groups that are studied [in anthropology] can be safely called marginal.... The conclusion always arrived at is that modernization and increasing awareness of true Islam are inclining these groups toward better integration into the society." (p. 653) The indigenization debate in the region, unlike earlier debates, rejects the theories and methodologies of the West, partly as a result of the oil boom: "Now modernity seemed attainable, or at least affordable.... Since the West could be challenged economically, it could also be challenged intellectually." (p. 653) Despite the flurry of interpretations of Ibn Khaldun's work, no new paradigm has emerged, Shami says.

Lila Abu-Lughod (1989) discusses the Orientalist aspects of Western anthropological fieldwork in the Middle East. Her thesis is that most work been confined to three "zones": segmentation, the harem, and Islam. These are, in the words of Appadurai, "gatekeeping concepts". (1986:357) This may be due to the fact that anthropologists' "training within the discipline of anthropology has been stronger than their training in the languages, literatures, and history of the Middle East. Yet they fall

within Said's definition of an Orientalist as 'anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient'." (Abu-Lughod 1989:268) Despite anthropologists' reliance on fieldwork rather than texts, and even with cultural relativists from Boas to Geertz, much anthropology has served colonial interests. Abu-Lughod says the East/West dichotomy isn't as salient as other anthropological dualities such as primitive/modern or self/other. (p. 279) And there are other constraints in the discipline, such as anthropologists' preference for peripheral, sparsely populated mountains and deserts, versus cities which are the centers of power. (p. 279) She suggests some "zones" in the Mideast that deserve more attention, such as political economy and capitalist transformation of peasant life. (p. 288)

Samir Amin's 1989 work, *Eurocentrism*, built upon the Orientalism concept as well as Amin's earlier ideas, and has become another cornerstone in the anticolonial canon. Amin attacks "bourgeois scholarship" as pseudo-universalist and imperialistic. Eurocentrism, for Amin, is not just a concept of European superiority, but also a "global project" that legitimates expansion and domination, with Nazism as the extreme example. In one chapter, he specifically takes on traditional Marxism, "formed both out of and against the Enlightenment," as both Orientalist and Eurocentrist. (p. 119)

Since *Orientalism*, many Middle Eastern scholars completely rejected modernity, secularism, Marxism and Western approaches in general. Amin attacks this nativism as well as Eurocentrism. He describes nativism, or "provincialism", as a particularist, anti-universalist "right to difference", and in his mind it's simply another form of ethnocentrism. He questions whether a complete rejection of all things Western and a turning inward are the solutions to eurocentrism.

Nativists (Abdel-Malek has been characterized as such) stress the clash between the "Third World" and West, often equating them with tradition and modernity, respectively. Simply linking the Third World with tradition shows the inherent bias and limitations of the concept, and it only enhances the differences between the "modern" and "traditional" worlds at a time when they are coming closer together. Such thinking, however, can be powerful, and has been at the root of political events, such as the revolution in Iran, as Foucault observed (1978), and the Salman Rushdie affair.

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Amin's solutions to ethnocentric scholarship are similar to those he brought forward in *The Arab Nation*. He favors the historical materialism of Marx mainly because of its critique of capitalism, but not in a purely mechanical fashion. He incorporates cultural elements into historical materialism through the concepts of "unequal development" and a revised distinction between centers and peripheries. In an example, Amin explores the roots of Orientalism itself (which may be said to be a part of eurocentrism). He recalls medieval Mediterranean civilization, when Islam was in full flourish with a "tributary mode of production." During this time, scholars like Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas and ibn-Rushd interacted, understood and critiqued one another. But after increasing militarization in the 12th and 13th centuries, tolerance and trade waned, and the two regions separated, ideologically. The former periphery (Europe) became the center. Amin would like to see, at the least, the ancient Egyptian and Phonecian civilizations recognized for their influence on Greece and Europe. Amin's goal, like many others', is a universalist science of culture. He writes:

> It is necessary to pursue debate and not to avoid it on the grounds that the views that anyone forms about others are and always will be false; that the French will never understand the Chinese (and vice versa), that men will never understand women,... that only Europeans can truly understand Europe, Chinese China, Christians Christianity, and Moslems Islam...
> (p. 125)

Val Moghadam (1989) added her voice to the debate, in a review of *Eurocentrism*. She notes that many so-called all-encompassing universal discourses ignore or deny gender, class and cultural differences which are very real. Regarding nativism, she recognizes that it "can be expected in areas which have had unpleasant encounters with the outside," and especially the Mideast, but it results in "defensiveness and insular thinking" in which "cultural dependence, orientalism, neo-colonialism and cognitive imperialism are blanket terms for any concept, practice or institution that originates ih 'the West.'" This causes a rejection of Marxism, feminism, democracy, socialism and secularism, with "Islam" the only acceptable ideology. (p. 88)

I agree with her suggestion that "concepts derived from diverse cultures, experiences and histories should be part of the movement toward a genuinely universal social science." (p. 90) These concepts, she says,

need to be rationalized and secularized, and it must be recognized that a distinction exists between "a sociology of the Middle East and an Islamic sociology." If the former is the goal, societal and historical events must retain their uniqueness, but be identified in general concepts which allow for difference, she says. The trick, of course, is coming to agreement on the general concepts to be used. Moghadam is right in suggesting that Marxist concepts seem to be the most flexible and appealing for this purpose, though I'm not sure that combining them with "the political goals of socialism and democracy" would elicit the universal support necessary. (p. 98)

Bryan Turner (1989) has contributed more insight to the debate recently. He rightly places the Orientalism debate in the context of global political changes, and suggests that "cultural globalism may challenge rather than support cognitive relativism because the idea of separateness and different cultural traditions cannot be maintained." He notes that issues of "otherness" and threats from "alien belief systems" often become prominent only in times of national crisis or social disruption, and in our century, there has been an increasing political necessity to understand Islam because it has been at the center of many international crises. Cultural globalism brings with it opposition and anti-modernism, and it is in this context that Orientalism (and other such concepts) must be perceived. Turner defends Said, saying all the criticism directed at *Orientalism* has been "superficial." Turner exposes specific problems in Orientalist thought without resorting to nativism, such as the paradox of religious origins. He asks, "is Christianity an oriental religion since clearly it has its roots in the Jewish tradition which some writers would regard as oriental? This issue in turn takes us to the debate about the origins of western culture as such..." (p. 633) He goes further to say that much of modern science and technology originated in ancient China, which was regarded by Orientalists as stagnant and stationary. Turner also reminds us that Orientalism was not always negative, as for example when it has adopted a romantic perspective towards the Mideast. Like Rassam, Turner takes on the issue of racism, stressing that since all human societies adopt "We/They" ideologies, the West was not alone in such simplification. And most significantly, he argues that the critics of *Orientalism* have produced no alternative discourses, and "if there is no alternative to discourse, then there is little point in attempting to replace oriental discourse with some improved or correct analysis of 'the orient'.... Do we want a better description or an alternative description?" (p. 635)

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Turner offers three reponses to Orientalism: First, he lauds the current debate because it has been beneficial in itself, spreading awareness of a diverse and complex Middle East. Second, he offers as an alternative to the "difference" of Orientalism (we versus they, East versus West) a "discourse of sameness," which would emphasize the continuities between cultures, like a "new form of secular ecumenicalism." Finally, with the emergence of culltural globalism, he urges us to recognize the impenetration by common forces around the globe. This would shift emphasis away from the ethnocentrist questions of Orientalism and similar concepts, to a more important form of "global sociology", perhaps the "universalist" science that so many desire. (p. 635)

Elizabeth Picard (1990) has traced the recent development of Middle East studies in France, which has had perhaps the most intimate intellectual relations with the region of any Western country. For France, North Africa is the "nearest Orient", while for Maghribians, France is the closest Western, "modern" reference. Yet as colonial ties were cut, so too were many intellectual ties. Revolutions closed other centers of study in Beirut and Teheran, and both Arab and Western social scientists have been exiled, detained, and even killed for alleged spying. Concurrent with the rise of fundamentalism has been a rise in studies of Islam by French scholars.

Whereas themes in the 1970's were industrialization, agrarian reform, the army, state apparatuses, and political parties and ideologies (with special attention to political elites), in the 80's the turn to Islam was "a way out of the dead end into which focusing on the nation-state and confidence in modernization theory had led Middle Eastern studies," as Picard sees it. (p. 61) For decades, Islam was studied only from scriptures and philosophical and metaphysical writings; now attention turned to the relation of Islam to society, culture and politics. Theories from Ibn Khaldun also re-emerged, reflecting the general trend toward indigenization. After Lebanon plunged into dissaray, prevailing Marxist class analyses came to be seen as flawed, since in Lebanon there was nothing like class struggle for domination of the state. Khaldun, on the other hand, viewed political power as royal authority over which rival factions struggle, through mediation of an ideological or religious message. A complimentary approach stresses the lasting influence of Ottoman patrimonial heritage on patron-client relations; this reflects the redistribution system.

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In Germany, too, Oriental studies have gone through rapid changes. Johansen (1990) tells how Middle East study in Germany isn't covered by a single academic discipline, but by geography, political science and anthropology (the anthropological center is the University of Bielefeld). He notes an important aspect of research that exists in many countries: competition between disciplines for scarce funds leads to more use of social science methods such as advertising techniques. This sometimes leads scholars to defend their work by stating that their approach, or their discipline, is the only sound approach to reality. This, he says, is rational in terms of scarce resources, but harmful for interdisciplinary cooperation. Hence the lack of a single field of Middle East studies combined with competition among disciplines results in the lack of a single paradigm for Middle East studies. Instead, publications "define the limits of methodological and theoretical pluralism." (p, 101) Scarce financial resources, by the way, have also been a reason behind the high-minded style of writing in recent, critical anthropology, as Marcus and Fisher (1986:xi) note. Abu-Lughod adds other factors that frame anthropological study. For example, paradigms within a given discipline or branch of discipline; the politics of academia; standards of anthropological competence; and "national intellectual milieus". Also, she wryly observes, "one way to make a name for oneself is to say something new about an old debate, preferably in argument with a famous elder, dead or alive." (1989:280)

Beyond Orientalism: Study of the "Other" in Anthropology

I will now go beyond Orientalism to explore the broader context in which it must be viewed, as Turner and others have suggested. The very existence of anthropology and similar disciplines assumes that it is possible study other cultures. The questions to be asked are, Are biases healthy for anthropologists when studying other cultures? What kind of power relation is created or reinforced in cross-cultural studies? Just whom are anthropologists writing for, and who defines the concepts they use? These questions were addressed by several scholars beginning in the 1960's, concurrent with rising criticism of Orientalist scholarship. Of course, such concerns have pervaded anthropology at least since Boas, but were overshadowed by functional and "scientific" approaches. And certainly the current theoretical debate will be superceded by evolutionist frameworks and methodological approaches, and on and on.

Clifford Geertz (1973) reintroduced a Weberian concern for "meaning" and interpretation among scholars as social actors. He balanced this with

the British social anthropological concern for social structure which had been prevalent in study of the Mideast. His basic premise is that ethnographic work is, more than anything, a text , comparable to fiction, and with a specific audience in mind -- other academics. The best way to counter the biases all anthropologists have is to rely on "thick description," he said. (p. 15)

Pierre Bourdieu (1977), like Geertz, did fieldwork in the Mideast, and more explicitly theorized the power relations in ethnography. The relationship between the anthropologist and informant "contains the makings of a theoretical distortion," for the behavior observed often has the character of a drama, played out for a spectator, and this shouldn't be mistaken for practical activity. Practice, rather, is masked by these improvisations, and to ascertain it the anthropologist must mediate between a "phenomenological" approach (an "insider's view") and an "objectivist" approach (the outsider's knowledge of hidden social and psychological forces). (p. 3)

While Geertz draws mainly from Weber, Bourdieu draws mostly from Marx; both approaches have limitations, as Abu-Lughod observes. For instance, both types of analysis are useless where there are contradictory discourses, within homogeneous groups and even in individuals speaking in different contexts, as she encountered in her own fieldwork. Also, she notes, both approaches are ahistorical, and generally they leave many key issues unresolved. (1989:274) Bias, of course, remains: Geertz, she notes, who did fieldwork in Morocco, called it a "wild west sort of place". (p. 279)

Michel Foucault and Juergen Habermas went further than Geertz or Bourdieu. They both refute claims of objectivity and completeness. Foucault pioneered the idea that an author has no relation to his work after it's written: the author's interpretation becomes no more significant than any other reader's. All history, according to Foucault, must be assessed in terms of its own period, and history in general is an accumulation of knowledge. "Archeology" is required to dig out repressed ideologies, and "untie all those knots that historians have patiently tied". (1972:170) Foucault's view of mankind is pessimistic: there once existed mankind without "rational Man" and there will again. All mankind is ephemeral and will soon dissappear anyway, according to Foucault. "It is comforting and a profound relief to think that man is nothing but a recent invention," he writes. (in Winkel 1989:17)

It is apparent from these views that Foucault was a catalyst in the intellectual changes which brought Orientalism into the light, and his views have been at the heart of "postmodern anthropology", which holds that discourse makes the world, rather than mirroring it. He urges that we look beyond language -- a tool of repression -- to see the structure of society which has made many people linguistically and economically incompetent, or "silenced". He has helped shape the view that "rational" science is just one ideology, the product of a specific worldview. Said's most important point, from Foucault, is that Orientalism has perpetuated not only falsehoods, but a certain power relation. But as Nader notes, "Hegemonic culture is not constructed by anthropologists, but by global power holders for whom we sometimes unwittingly work." (1988:157) Anthropologists are only beginning to examine the issues raised by Foucault, as Abu-Lughod says.

Habermas recognized that many philosophical systems are logical and consistent, but are based on hidden a priori assumptions, which become tools for domination by an elite. His solution is an "ideal communication" free of such assumptions, an "Ideal Speech Situation". In such a situation, where all points of view are welcome, any supposition can be rejected without overthrowing the entire framework or discourse. Through this communicative interaction people create an intersubjective understanding of themselves and their world, and this is in turn interpreted through social action. "Reason" must be freed from both the micro or instinctual (Freudian) dimension, and the macro or relations-of-production (Marxist) dimension, through critique and its practical consequences. (Winkel 1989, p.25-6)

Both Habermas and Foucault favored psychoanalytic techniques to get at "suppressed dialogues". This approach has been adapted by some anthropologists for ethnographic fieldwork (for instance Paul, 1989) and I think this can be a useful alternative to questionnaires and certain quantitative methods.

Noam Chomsky has also been instrumental in the debate, causing a "linguistic revolution" as Winkel (1989) says, and his theories resemble Habermas'. Chomsky questioned the belief that words are drawn from a "language storehouse"; rather, he believes, people have an innate knowledge to create a "universal language" and in fact are constantly making up new words and phrases. Through practice and activity (political activism), Chomsky says, people question presuppositions and myths, and create new myths; in this way they socially create truth.

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More recently, George Marcus (1985) has discussed notions of bias and scholarship. He relates models like Orientalism and Eurocentrism to the scientific "paradigms" described by Thomas Kuhn. These models having been overturned, anthropologists, in the swirling realm of scholarly debate, are groping to discover a new paradigm for studying other cultures.

Melford Spiro (1985) discusses the concept of "cultural relativism," or the recognition that certain ideas, concepts, attitudes or symbols, are inexorably tied to a certain culture's own ideology, and shouldn't be imposed upon other cultures. Spiro breaks down the concept into three different parts. (1) Descriptive relativism, he says, is a corollary of the theory of cultural determinism (wherein a culture is seen as determining human social and psychological characteristics): it deals with the "variability in social and psychological characteristics across human groups." (2) Normative relativism assumes that "because all standards are culturally constituted, there are no available transcultural standards by which different cultures might be judged on a scale of merit or worth." (pp.260-261) Finally, (3) epistemological relativism adopts the Lockean view of the human mind as a blank slate; everything found on that slate is seen as culturally inscribed. Thus, "virtually all human social and psychological characteristics are culturally determined." (p.261)

For some scholars who have done actual fieldwork in the Mideast with these new theoretical considerations in mind, ethnography became personal reflection. Kevin Dwyer (1982), for instance, in his approach to fieldwork in Morocco, sought to mediate between a "scientific" approach and a more personal style, in an experimental way. His fieldwork consisted of a series of tape-recorded interviews, and the published volume is comprised of verbatim conversations with a single Moroccan informant, interpsersed with brief descriptions of events.

This "event + dialogue motif" serves Dwyer well, for it allows the reader to learn about Moroccan customs and institutions from a "native" view, but organized and regulated in a scientific way. It becomes bound not to one culture, but to both. Abu-Lughod (1989), however, points out that "Dwyer allows us to see the intrusive nature of his questions and the way in which the dialogues were initiated by him and occasionally annoyed his informant." To her, the conversations were not really dialogues at all, but mostly Dwyer asking questions and his informant answering, sometimes annoyed. There were no true two-way dialogue, she says. (p. 277)

A section of Dwyer's book is devoted to theoretical issues, and Dwyer provides some valuable insights. The notions of Self and Other, he says, not only reflect individuals but "the cultural and societal interests expressed in individual action." (p.255) (This is epistemological relativism, in Spiro's definition.) In order to understand the Other being studied, Dwyer says, we must pursue and expose our own Self, that is, our own internal cultural program, for anthropologists, like colonists, are intruders with a certain historical and social relation to the countries they visit. Anthropology, Dwyer says, must give up its "contemplative" stance -- its view of the non-Western Other by the Western Self -- which was part of the very formation of anthropology.

Paul Rabinow (1977) approached his work in Morocco with the same theoretical considerations. Like Geertz, he believed that such work was only interpretation, but like Bourdieu, he stressed that the resulting facts were the work of both himself and his informants, and not an accurate account of their lives. He even admits creating composite individuals for his account, a questionable practice at best. He discusses his informants in terms of their "otherness" from himself, "from the French-speaking hotel owner to the orthodox paragon of a saintly lineage," and decides to leave when confronted with too much "otherness". (Abu-Lughod 1989:276)

In the last few years, anthropological discourse has moved beyond notions of Self and Other, and begun actually reanalyzing the Western Self in anthropology. Abu-Lughod stresses,

> To recognize that the self may not be so unitary and that the other might actually consist of many others who may not be so 'other' after all is to raise the theoretically interesting problem of how to build in ways of accepting or describing differences without denying similarities or turning these various differences into a single, frozen Difference. (p. 277)

She notes other aspects of the anthropological Self that are only beginning to be addressed, such as gender, ethnicity and disciplinary constraints. (p. 278) Certainly this is a quandry for anthropologists, for as Nader says, "It is not possible for each of us to think with three or four brains." (Nader 1988:157) Deconstruction of texts helps, Abu-Lughod says, but this is not enough. New techniques need to be developed in historical research and especially fieldwork techniques, anthropologists'

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specialty. Most importantly in this regard, local interests must be understood in a nonlocal context, for "transnational flows of culture, capital, political power, and military force have shaped ordinary life in the Arab world for centuries." (Abu-Lughod 1989:299-301)

Feminist perspectives emerged in anthropology along with the interpretivist "revolution",(3) and have developed significantly since. Frances Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe and Colleen Ballerino Cohen (1989) have provided an interesting critique of the "postmodern" anthropology spawned by Foucault and others. They say that the new ways of structuring ethnographies may only make them more obscure, and difficult for anyone but specialists to understand. And they note that the "new" issues raised -- codes of meaning in culture, the inseparability of language and politics, and the power relationship in ethnography -- have been explored in feminist theory for the past 40 years. The postmodern anthropologists "perceive a new and uninhabited space where, in fact, feminists have long been at work." (p.14)

Whereas anthropologists hold a position of dominance (and now admit it), feminists, the authors say, speak from the position of the "other". Yet many male anthropologists dismiss feminist theory, partly out of ignorance of its full spectrum, and partly out of dispair: "When Western White males can no longer define the truth, their response is to conclude that there is no truth," Sarah Lennox is quoted as saying. (p.15) Academic males, the authors say, fear entering into a discourse where the "other" has the priveledge: "Intellectual cross-dressing, like its physical counterpart, is less disruptive of traditional orders of priveledge when performed by women than by men." (p.17)

The real power relations for postmodern anthropologists, the authors rightly state, are not global but in the halls of anthropology departments, and politics are important. Feminist theory, they say, "differs from postmodernism in that it acknowledges its grounding in politics," (p.20) and "where there is no such explicit political structure, the danger of veiled agendas is great." (p.22) The great strength of the women's movement is that it acknowledges diversity, while recognizing unity, as the authors note. They suggest that the new ethnography "embed its theory in a grounded politics" instead of unknowingly subverting anthropology's inherent agenda. (p.28)

Another recent perspective which makes a similar plea is Islamic anthropology. This is not indigenous or native in character, and isn't

restricted to study of the Mideast, or to study by Islamic anthropologists. And it is not anthropology which studies Islam, but rather anthropology within an Islamic framework.

Akbar S. Ahmed, a Pakistani anthropologist, published a book on the subject in 1987. He defines Islamic anthropology as "the study of Muslim groups by scholars committed to the universalistic principles of Islam -- humanity, knowledge, tolerance -- relating micro village tribal studies in particular to the larger historical and ideological frameworks of Islam." (p.56) The book is divided into two parts, the first a discussion of British social anthropology and its linkage with Orientalism; and the second, an outline of Islamic anthropology.

Such an anthropology, Ahmed says, should be a corrective to distorted Western approaches, many of which have grouped regional differences as "Indian Islam", "Moroccan Islam", "Turkish Islam", etc. Rather, he says, there is only one Islam but many Muslim societies. His model would categorize such societies as follows: (1) Tribal segmentary Islam (Bedouins, Berbers and Pukhtuns.); (2) the Ottoman or cantonment model (Safawis, Ottomans and Moghuls); (3) Great-River Islamic civilizations (on the Indus, Tigris and Euphrates); (4) Islam under Western colonialsim; and (5) Resurgent Islam (Pakistan, Iran). This ideal-typical framework could be used for historical comparisons, he says. Western anthropology need not be entirely abandoned, he says, only stripped of its limitations as defined by Islamic principles.

Merryl Wyn Davies has also published an influential book on Islamic anthropology (1988). In her view, "Islamic anthropology accepts that culture and society are inherent.... Relativism exists in Islamic anthropology because culture and society are diverse; but what they are relative to is open to debate by all: the conceptual base of Islamic values." (p.8) She cites two perspectives that distinguish Islamic anthropology, both derived from the Qur'an: (1) Mankind is created from a single "living entity" (nafs) and men and women are viewed as equal; (2) God appointed diversity of laws (shariah) and ways of life (minhaj) . Davies shows a good knowledge of anthropology in general, and lays out her proposal in a thorough, organized and well-supported way. "The only thing that is neutral about anthropology is the word itself," she says, hence we now have "double-barrelled" anthropologies: structuralist anthropology, Marxist anthropology, Islamic anthopology. (p.11) And the latter is not a contradiction but a blending of theory and method; it redefines anthropology as "subordinate to a distinct conceptual and

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civilizational fabric, that of Islam." (p.143) There was never a "Christian anthropology" but secular science is an ideology nonetheless. With Islamic anthropology, the ideology is explicit.

An ambitious "Islamization of knowledge" project was begun by the late Ismail al-Faruqi through his International Institute of Islamic Thought in Washington, and the most active debate over Islamic anthropology, (in the U.S.), has taken place in the pages of the Institute's journal Social Sciences. The journal stresses the need for social scientists to "render the issues operational to Muslims," (AbuSulayman 1989:xiii) which is exactly the purpose it serves, and does so very well. Many of the articles are devoted to developing "an Islamic Alternative" to secular Western thought(4) and this includes anthropology. A.R. Momin (1989) reviewed Ahmed's book in one issue. Momin criticizes Ahmed for his "superficial, ahistorical and uncritical view of Western anthropology." Specifically, Ahmed uncritically accepts Western anthropology's definition as the study of "other" cultures, as well as the "positivist doctrine of objectivity and value-neutrality," according to Momin. (p.146) The main criticisms are that Ahmed's vision suffers from a lack of "methodological systemization" and that he falls into the same typological trap as the Orientalists with such categories as "tribal segmentary Islam". (p.147)

Momin doesn't believe Islamic anthropology should be "dogmatic" or "doctrinaire", and offers three principles: "(1) an authentic anthropology of Islam as a living faith and culture, (2) the contribution of Muslim scholars to anthropological research, (3) the relevance and utility of Islamic insights and perspectives to a universal science of man." (p.148) These principles can be used to combat the distortion and misrepresentation of Islamic principles, history and communities through textual analysis and study, Momin says. Comparative studies should be historically informed and rooted in Islam, and non-Muslim scholars should be included in the discipline ("provided their researches are not colored by prejudice against Islam or Muslims") to guard against "cultural and academic sopilism". (p.149)

In another issue, Eric Winkel (1989) provides an insightful critique of Habermas and Foucault. He credits Said as having "made great advances in understanding the 'episteme' or knowledge-realm which denies the existence of Palestinians," (p.14)) but concentrates on the two thinkers currently so revered in Western scholarship. Winkel agrees with Foucault's pessimistic notion of man, and in fact feels he doesn't go far enough. His Islamic critique views modern, secular Man is an aberration,

and he traces the birth of rational Man to the Renaissance, an "abhorrent time" when man became arrogant and believed he could attain immortality without God. (p.18)

In fact, Foucault essentially confirmed this with his observation that in "scientific medicine," the corpse became the focus, defining life; it became man's property, not God's. Winkel cites Rene Guenon's quote that "humanism" means "to reduce everything to human proportions". (p.18) Habermas' "Ideal Speech Situation" is unrealistic, he says, because interests cannot always be generalized, and Truth, from an Islamic viewpoint, is grounded not in man but God. (p.16) Winkel charges that

> Habermas and Foucault do not extend their radical, anarchic perspectives far enough to realize that, although they have rejected the pitiful, limited, distorted god of Europe, they are not able to say that God is dead. While slightly better than the fanatics of Progress and Technology, they ignore the richness of traditional society. (p.23)

Laura Nader (1988) has perhaps the freshest perspective on the issues raised here. She advocates a "post-interpretive anthropology" with dialogue between opposing views, "one that is less cloistered, less defensive, and more intellectually hard-hitting and imaginative in terms of what we study". (p.149) Interpretive anthropology, as developed by Geertz, Marcus and others, claimed to be "post-paradigm, post-colonial, post-modern," but instead of fostering a variety of views, has replaced an objectivist orthodoxy with a subjectivist orthodoxy. Already, we can see efforts to establish the appropriate methods to go with the new awareness.

Interpretivism, she charges, "has promised but not produced prediction, control and testability". (p.152) The practice of anthropologists making themselves the focus of their work is seen by some as "repetitive and narcissistic" or "process fetishism"; others say the means are still bound by the ends, Nader notes. "If anthropology is cultural critique [as Marcus and Fisher claim]," she says, "then we need to make explicit choices about what anthropology is to be culturally critical about." (p.153) The approach implies that all reality is constructed and anyone can do ethnography. But, she says, the anthropological perspective is potentially valuable, and what is needed is constructive dialogue, especially between extreme ends of the field. Science, instead of being a single ideology, needs to recognize a plurality of views.

Conclustions

When considering a topic such as Orientalism and anthropology, it is important to consider such a plurality of views. By presenting the various perspectives I have here, I hope I have contributed to the discourse. Abdel-Malek, Said, Turner and others have laid the foundations for an alternative study of the Middle East. They have also provided a new perspective for research, and enriched a vigorous debate over the very nature of research itself.

There was a distinct East and West, and they existed in the minds of the inhabitants of both places. The dichotomy was created in the minds of colonizers, traders, intellectuals and others, and the wide acceptance of the concept created tangible realities which in turn reinforced the idea. As Marcus says, "virtually all human social and psychological characteristics are culturally determined." To take it a step further, it may be said that these social and psychological characteristics create the material reality in which humans live, with the natural world providing boundaries and contstraints of various kinds.

Now the boundaries between East and West are falling away, as the "cultural globalism" Bryan Turner speaks of is taking shape. Social bodies of every size have a life beyond the sum of their members, as Durkheim stressed, and undoubtedly the global culture will be no different in this respect. Social scientists are correct in trying to formulate a universal discourse, to understand the new and changing world we live in. But this discourse must be open to all viewpoints, and encourage debate between them.

In light of its historical, political and social contexts, then, Orientalism should not be attacked or replaced with inward-looking nativist thinking. (In fact, the raw data in some Orientalist works is the only such data available on some phenomena at certain times and is therefore valuable.) Rather, Orientalism must be exposed, recognized and viewed in the context in which it formed and flourished. It reveals more about the Selves who created it than the Others it studied. And as such, it can be seen as a relic of the past, unsuited for today's social science.

Notes

1. Some clarification of terminology is necessary before beginning. "Orientalism" is used here to denote the polarization of "East" and "West"

and the resulting biased view of the each toward the other, as described by Said. The terms "West", "East", "Occident" and "Orient" refer to Europe/America and the Middle East respectively, unless otherwise noted. Such categorization may itself be called Orientalism; it is used here both in the context of Orientalist discourse (where in quotation marks), and to refer solely to the two regions, not to the ideological baggage that often goes with them.

2. For other early critiques, see Jalal Al-e Ahmad, a populist Iranian writer who attacked foreign-educated scholars who immersed themselves in Western language and culture, in *Gharbzadegi* in the mid-1960s. The term has been translated as "occidentosis," "westoxication" or "euromania." See also Arkoun 1964, 1970; Laroui 1976; and Djait 1974.

3. Nader marks the introduction with Peggy Golde's 1970 book Women in the Field: Anthropological Experiences (Chicago: Aldine Publishing); certainly female perspectives could be traced back to Benedict and Mead in the 30s, but a distinct "feminist" perspective as an ideology formed in the 60s.

4. For instance, al-Alwani, T.J. "Toward an Islamic Alterniative in Thought and Knowledge," in vol. 6, no. 1 (Sept. 1989) p. 1; Ali, Ausaf "An Approach to the Islamization of Social and Behavioral Sciences," in the same issue, p. 37; Moten, A.R. "Islamization of Knowledge: Methodology of Research in Political Science," vol. 7, no. 2, p.161.

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