The problem of self-awareness is one of the most fundamental issues in Islamic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind. In the Avicennian tradition, self-awareness as “knowledge by presence” (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is regarded as immediate, self-evident, and infallible, playing a constitutive role in explaining the immateriality and survival of the soul. By contrast, inferentialist approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind—especially Peter Carruthers’ theory of self-interpretation—take self-awareness to be an interpretive, linguistically mediated, and fundamentally fallible process that arises through attributional and inferential mechanisms. By framing “first-person access” as a shared horizon between the two traditions, this study seeks to examine the possibility of reconciling and reinterpreting these apparently incompatible accounts. Its central question is: assuming a presential and infallible core in self-awareness, how can fallible interpretive and narrative layers be explained as distinct yet related levels in the constitution of the content of self-awareness? Employing an analytical–comparative method and distinguishing ontological and epistemological levels from psychological and cognitive ones, the study proposes a “twofold model of self-awareness.” On this model, self-awareness consists of a “minimal presential core” as the condition of the possibility of first-person awareness, and an “interpretive–narrative layer” as the level at which the subject’s conceptual and temporal identity is formed. In addition to resolving the apparent conflict between the two sides, this framework provides a theoretical basis for methodical dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind.