Document Type : Scientific-research
Author
Associate Professor, Department of Islamic philosophy and theology, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
This article, based on a descriptive-analytical method, focuses on the phenomenological role and function of intuition of essence in Descartes and Husserl. Although the author introduces intuition as a common methodological process in the phenomenology of Descartes and Husserl, he observes clear differences between them in terms of the working components in the category of intuition. By making a necessary distinction between the mental actions of intuition and deduction, Descartes considers intuition to be merely the creator of immediate intrinsic self-evidence and worthy of the basis of the philosophy of certainty. In order to go beyond the certainty resulting from the self-evidence of immediate intuition, Descartes resorts to the categories of time and memory. But since memory lacks the capacity to guarantee the indisputability of intuition from the "present" to the "past" or "future", it resorts to the concept of God, or in fact, the doctrine of the entry of divinity into history, to guarantee the temporal continuity of the immediate indisputability of the intuition of the "I". However, for Husserl, intuition depends primarily on the intentional aspect, and without the basis and foundation provided by intuition, it is not possible to achieve a certain basis for phenomenal knowledge. By adopting a completely new approach, Husserl tries to obtain the intrinsic indisputability of intuition, contrary to Descartes' wish, not from the divine intellect, but from the transcendental ego or subjective objectivity, which is the existential condition of objects. Therefore, he places "imagination" at the center of the intuition of essence, and by introducing new concepts, he completes intuition by defining it as an epistemological decision and responsibility, the coherence of essence, and the continuity of the ego of transcendence.
Keywords
Main Subjects
)