Critique of Type Identity Theory in Explaining Consciousness in Light of Philosophical Views and Neuroscientific Evidence

Arab Mistani, Zeynab

doi:10.22059/jop.2026.402726.1006948

Critique of Type Identity Theory in Explaining Consciousness in Light of Philosophical Views and Neuroscientific Evidence

Document Type : Scientific-research

Author

Zeynab Arab Mistani

Ph.D. Graduated, Department of Philosophy, Sanandaj Branch, Islamic Azad University, Sanandaj, Iran.

10.22059/jop.2026.402726.1006948

Abstract

The mind-body problem remains one of the deepest philosophical issues, examining the relationship between the thinking aspect of human beings and their material basis. Following the introduction of a substantial distinction between mind and matter, this problem evolved into a confrontation between dualism and physicalism, turning the philosophy of mind into a field of profound reflection. Physicalism, which regards all phenomena as material, faces serious challenges in accounting for consciousness, particularly the inadequacy of type-identity theory in explaining the subjective qualities (qualia) of experience. Employing a descriptive-explanatory method and drawing on insights from cognitive neuroscience, this study seeks to recast this longstanding puzzle as an empirical question: How does the brain, as a material entity, give rise to the mind, a constellation of conscious experiences? Type-identity theory, as one of the most prominent reductive physicalist approaches, identifies mental states with neurophysiological processes and offers a framework for explaining consciousness based on the principle of metaphysical simplicity and consistency with causal closure. Nevertheless, the theory proves inadequate when confronted with the subjective qualities of experience, the complexities of multiple realizability, and explanatory gaps. Through a systematic critique of the metaphysical presuppositions of physicalism, the present research highlights the shortcomings of type-identity theory. It emphasizes the need for integrative approaches -including non-reductive physicalism and phenomenological analyses- for a deeper understanding of consciousness. It is expected that this study will contribute to advancing interdisciplinary dialogues in the fields of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.

Keywords

Mind

body

physicalism

neuroscience

consciousness

type identity theory

Subjects

philosophy

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