Document Type : Scientific-research
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Abstract
This paper argues that Bergsonian duration (la durée) is not inherently an internal phenomenon. However, this proposition arises by considering two distinct types of discourse within Bergson’s philosophy: on one hand, his insistence on the metaphysical nature of duration and its irreducibility to any internal or psychological state; and on the other, the undeniable prominence and frequency of references to the ‘inner’, the ‘psyche’, and ‘consciousness’ when he discusses duration. This article resolves this dichotomy by introducing the distinction between privilege and primacy. However, to legitimize speaking of duration in general (not duration in a specific work among Bergson's oeuvre), an initial effort will be made to offer a methodological proposal for a particular reading of the relationship among Bergson's works. Then, based on this proposal, the second effort and the primary finding of the article will be to demonstrate that applying duration to the psyche is of the kind of converted predication (predication by conversion, aks al-haml). Finally, the significance of this finding lies in liberating Bergsonian duration from an interpretive framework that holds both historical and logical precedence over other interpretations: the spiritualistic reading of Bergson. This spiritualistic reading serves as the foundation for two other misinterpretations of Bergson (specifically, naive realism and a form of correlationism). Consequently, demonstrating the falsity of the spiritualistic reading effectively separates Bergsonian duration from all three erroneous readings.
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