The received narrative of the history of the problem of the primacy of existence in Islamic philosophy represents the development linearly: the problem originates in the doctrine of the mental distinction between existence and essence in Peripatetic philosophy, proceeds to the theory of the conceptuality of existence in Illuminationist philosophy, is subsequently articulated in a disjunctive form in the thought of Mīr Dāmād, and is finally brought to completion with the affirmation of the primacy of existence in Transcendent Philosophy. Focusing on the historical role of Mīr Dāmād, this article offers a systematic critique of this account and argues that the received narrative suffers from fundamental historical, conceptual, and documentary difficulties. To this end, the article first reconstructs the general framework of the narrative and identifies its major turning points. It then examines the logical structure of the problem and the historical configuration of the locus of dispute. In the next step, through a close analysis of Mīr Dāmād’s authenticated works and a careful reconsideration of his terminology, conceptual apparatus, and manner of approaching the problem, it is shown that the disjunctive formulation of the problem of primacy is neither present in the conceptual structure of his writings nor can it be plausibly attributed to him. The article concludes that the received narrative fails to adequately account for Mīr Dāmād’s position and that moving beyond it constitutes a necessary step toward developing a methodologically sound alternative account of the history of the problem of the primacy of existence.