On Boghossian's Objection on Putnam's Internal Realism

Ghadiri, Hamed

doi:10.22059/jop.2020.293991.1006490

Document Type : Scientific-research

Author

Hamed Ghadiri

PhD graduate in philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

https://doi.org/10.22059/jop.2020.293991.1006490

Abstract

Arguing against relativism and constructivism and defending objectivism, Paul Boghossian considers three theories concerning description-dependence of fact, including Putnam's theory on the interpenetration of fact and convention. Boghossian holds that the basis of Putnam's theory is the phenomenon of conceptual relativity; so, if we reject his view about the phenomenon, his theory will be rejected. Accordingly, He explains this phenomenon and criticizes Putnam's attitudes towards it and finally concludes that this ‘argument’ cannot prove Putnam's theory. Here firstly it will be argued that Putnam himself was aware of these objections and had developed some ideas to solve them; so, using his texts and arguments, we try to reply to the main objections of Boghossian to Putnam's view about this phenomenon. Secondly, it will be argued that, in contrast to Bogghossian's belief, Putnam's theory is not based on the phenomenon of conceptual relativity. Instead, the idea of the interpenetration of fact and convention is based on two other arguments: the model-theoretic argument and the argument from the brain-in-a-vat scenario. Therefore, even if Boghossian's objections to Putnam's view about the phenomenon of conceptual relativity were acceptable, they could not reject Putnam's ideas on the interpenetration of fact and convention.

Keywords

References

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On Boghossian's Objection on Putnam's Internal Realism

References

References

Volume 18, Issue 1 - Serial Number 34September 2020Pages 169-188

Volume 18, Issue 1 - Serial Number 34
September 2020
Pages 169-188