The Conceptual Incompatibility of Free Will from the Perspective of Transcendental Wisdom

Document Type : Scientific-research

Authors

1 PhD graduate in Comparative Philosophy,Qom University

2 Professor in Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology

Abstract

The problem of free will has historically evolved. What is observed in the contemporary period with the emergence of empirical science is the relationship between free will and physical determinism. Although physical determinism has been weakened in some approaches to empirical science, the free will problem still remains strong in philosophical debates. What is discussed in this article can be shown as the following argument. 1. Determinism is either true or false; 2. If determinism is correct, the past determines the future, and consequently our will, and therefore we do not have free will; 3. If determinism is wrong, in an undetermined world, the human will is by chance and not free; 4. Therefore, in any case, we do not have free will. The first introduction is an obvious and true statement. The second premise is the content of the consequence argument and the third premise is the claim of the luck argument. The final proposition is the logical result of the preparations. Comparative studies of this article also showed that transcendental wisdom, through accepting the luck argument and not providing an acceptable answer to the consequence argument, must accept the final result of this argument, which is the rejection of free will. In general, it seems that no acceptable theoretical solution to the contemporary problem of free will has been found so far, and a solution to this problem must be sought in practical reasons.

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References

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