A Defense of Interventionist Account of Basing Relation

Document Type : Scientific-research


PhD Graduate in Philosophy, University of Tehran


 In order to know under what conditions one has doxastic justification for believing in p, we need to determine what the relationship should be between one’s believing that p and his reasons for believing that p so that we can say that his belief that p is based on his reasons for believing that p. Epistemologists refer to this relation as the “basig relation”. Different theories about basing relation attempt to answer this question that under what conditions one’s beliefs are based of his reasons. Most epistemologists believe in causal account of the basing relation and therforte form their point of view, if there was a proper causal relationship between one’s belief and his reasons, we can say that one’s belief is based on his reasons. Although the causal view is intuitive, the problems of this view have led some epistemologists to adopt other views about basing relation. Recently, however, a causal account of the basing relation has been proposed, which claims to answer the most important problems of causal views. This artivle is devoted to the explaining and evalution of this view about basing relation. After explaining this view, I will examine the three main problems of causal account of the basig relation and show that this view can be defended about the basing relation in the face of these problems.


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