Document Type : Scientific-research
Authors
1 PhD Graduate of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba’I u University
2 Associated Professor of western philosophy, Iranian Institute of Philosophy
Abstract
It is widely known that Kant refers all the three basic problems of philosophy to the single ultimate question “what is man?”, the task of finding a solution for which is assigned to the philosophical anthropology. One considers Critique of Pure Reason in this regard, however, one surprisingly finds that this question is entirely absent from Kant’s own magnum opus. By its very nature indeed, transcendental philosophy is incapable of arising this question thus formulated, since it eventually leads to a subject, not to a human being. Heidegger’s exegetical reading of Kant notwithstanding, one should not simply conclude, however, that the question of the essence of man eventuates by Kant in the formation of a metaphysics of subjectivity. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception is not so much a subject-centered metaphysical theory, of the sort that Heidegger assumes, as it denotes a transcendental formulation of Kant’s general anthropological conception. What lies at the core of this anthropological view is the twofoldness of human place in cosmos, in terms of which the tension between the marginality and, simultaneously, centrality of man in relation to the world can be articulated. We refer to this anthropological conception as “anthropological tension”, due to the irreducible duality that lies at its core.
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