Document Type : Scientific-research
Abstract
The problem of diagnosing science from pseudoscience- widely known as the Demarcation Problem- has both theoretical and practical significance in philosophy of science. While for decades attempts by philosophers have been dedicated to providing a satisfying solution to this problem, still there is no agreed answer to the question. The difficulties of demarcating science from pseudoscience can be divided into two main categories: challenges for defining a demarcating criterion, and challenges for applying the criterion to the occurred cases. Whereas most of the debates are centered around the first category, this paper focuses on one problem from the second one. Specification of the authority who possesses the necessary competence and legitimacy to discern science from pseudoscience is a difficulty for the application of demarcating criteria. It seems that the most complicated cases for this problem are those in which defenders of the suspected pseudoscience are themselves members of a scientific society. These cases are examples of a situation called “experts’ disagreement” in social epistemology. In this paper, I try to utilize insights from social epistemology about experts’ disagreement and complement them with the idea of “cognitive labor division” to overcome the challenge of finding the competent authority for identifying science from pseudoscience.
Keywords
- Science and Pseudoscience
- the Demarcation Problem
- Social Epistemology
- Experts
- Disagreement
- Cognitive Labor Division
Main Subjects
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