From Efficient Causal Necessity to Teleological Determinism in Metaphysics of Ε, Θ, Λ and Nicomachean Ethics

MOUSAVIAN, SEYEDAMIRALI

doi:10.22059/jop.2024.371293.1006814

From Efficient Causal Necessity to Teleological Determinism in Metaphysics of Ε, Θ, Λ and Nicomachean Ethics

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

SEYEDAMIRALI MOUSAVIAN

Ph.D. in Western Philosophy, Humanities Faculty, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

10.22059/jop.2024.371293.1006814

Abstract

The diversity of opinions regarding determinism stems from the multidimensional nature of Aristotle’s works and thinking. In Aristotle’s ethics, despite the presence of a general principle of necessity, determinism is treated differently than it is in his logical, physical, and metaphysical works. Metaphysics E 3 suggests that if the generation of all things is not necessary, then there exist principles and causes that arise and perish without undergoing a determined process of generation or decay. The fact that not everything is necessary implies that some causes and principles lack the dunamis (power) as a necessary condition for their generation and destruction, and thus their occurrence is accidental. Aristotle’s road map for negating strict and absolute necessity within the causal chain is to appeal to the possibility of incidental and accidental things or events. To this end, Aristotle adopts the strategy of acknowledging the necessity of incidental causes or, as it might be expressed, "the necessity of the unnecessary." Accidental events also aim to achieve a purpose, and according to Frede, they do not fall outside the realm of definite prediction. This article seeks to depict the contribution of both efficient and final causes within the causal structure of reality through the framework of causal necessity. The relationship between efficient causation and necessity, as well as the concept of efficient causal necessity in Aristotle’s metaphysics, can be understood through the concept of causal powers. If one analyzes the causal chain from the future to the past, an unrealized final cause, by virtue of final causality and causal influence, renders earlier events in the causal chain logically and predictably necessary. Ultimately, we aim to demonstrate that the interpretation of Metaphysics E 3 is consistent with both the analysis of the necessity of efficient and final causes, based on different assumptions, and the arguments supporting teleological determinism, including the imitation of nature by art.

Keywords

teleological determinism

causal necessity

coincidence

causal powers

intrinsic and incidental causation

hypothetical and absolute necessity

Dorothea Frede

Subjects

philosophy

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