The significance of identity propositions in Wittgenstein's logic surpasses that of any other proposition, whether simple or definite. It is through identity propositions that we can attain certainty about the objectivity and essential unity of conscious reality. Identity propositions serve as the basis for affirming or even denying other propositions; thus, identity propositions do not generate any other scientific propositions. However, without them, no other scientific proposition, whether true or false, can logically exist. Only by confirming the content of an identity proposition in other propositions can we consider them true or false. Without identity propositions, we cannot even speculate on what a world not based on these propositions would be like. This illustrates the essence of identity propositions that the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has addressed in various writings, particularly in his valuable work commonly referred to as "On Certainty" and the notes from 1914-1918. The scope of identity propositions encompasses the world, and the extent of the world is as vast as the logical territory underlying identity. The boundaries of the world and the limits of language have no other complete representatives among propositions besides identity propositions. According to Wittgenstein, these propositions lack the features of correspondence or representation; however, the necessity arising from them is a fundamental and primary necessity. Without identity propositions, we cannot think in the way we currently do, and thus discussing the nature of these propositions will undoubtedly be important and valuable in discovering and understanding the ontological logic embedded in Wittgenstein's language theory. Reality is not due to identity, but it is an instance of identity.