Rorty and

Rahim Nasirian, Iman; Hesamifar, Abdurrazzaq

doi:10.22059/jop.2025.385937.1006865

Document Type : Scientific-research

Authors

¹ PhD in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

² Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.

10.22059/jop.2025.385937.1006865

Abstract

According to Rorty's point of view, there is no authority called Truth to measure social values; established practices in society are not based on Truth but are dynamic products of free conversation, consensus, and agreement among members of society. Rorty's hope that it is possible to provide a criterion for measuring social values without appealing to the truth and solely through free-floating conversation has provoked many criticisms. The most central part of these criticisms, in line with what Richard Bernstein calls "Cartesian anxiety," refers to the concern that if there is no Truth, everything is lawful! In other words, for many critics, Rorty's standpoint against truth, his denial of the fixed foundations of belief and social obligations, inevitably means that we will have no reliable criteria by which to criticize the current beliefs and practices of society. Each argues differently that Rorty's view deprives society of the critical capacity to evaluate social values. In this article, with an analytical approach, we examine Rorty's point of view in the framework of this critical line. We aim to demonstrate that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding and an incoherent reading of Rorty's views. According to the conclusion of this research, his pragmatism not only does not mean denying the possibility of criticizing the current practices of society, but it is an innovative attempt to provide a plan of non-truth-centered critical constructs designed, in line with post-modern thought to escape it from Cartesian anxiety.

Keywords

Main Subjects

philosophy

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Philosophy

Rorty and "Cartesian Anxiety" The Critical Capacity of Richard Rorty’s Socio-Political Perspective

References

References

Volume 22, Issue 2 - Serial Number 43
March 2025
Pages 61-81

Rorty and "Cartesian Anxiety" The Critical Capacity of Richard Rorty’s Socio-Political Perspective

References

References

Volume 22, Issue 2 - Serial Number 43March 2025Pages 61-81

Volume 22, Issue 2 - Serial Number 43
March 2025
Pages 61-81