Proposition's Being Truth-Bearers and Impossibility of Pointing out to an Inexistent: Solution of the Liar Paradox

Document Type : Scientific-research

Authors

1 PhD student in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran

2 Associate Professor in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran

Abstract

Two main approaches to solve one group of liar paradox's versions _that is, the group in which demonstratives are used_ are denying self-reference sentences and denying that the liar sentence is a statement, which is the primary and genuine bearer of truth. The major problem with the first approach is that they have not explained why we do not have self-referential sentences and usually try to omit them with conventions. The main problem with the second approach is that they have not explained why the liar sentence would not constitute a statement. We, in this inquiry, after casting a new twosome division for all versions of the liar paradox, will present a solution, or probably a way of dissolution, for a cluster of the versions, namely the cluster in which demonstratives are used explicitly or implicitly_ a solution that, in a way, has the two approaches in it. The solution is this: since firstly propositions are primary and essential bearers of truth and secondly pointing out to an inexistent that is neither existent nor in relation with an existent is impossible, so no proposition in correspondence with the sentence "this sentence is false" is formed in our minds, because before this sentence is formed completely and before ascribing the predicate to the subject, no sentence was formed so that we could refer to it and ascribe a predicate to it. So we would not have any propositions in correspondence with the sentence so that it would be descripted to the truth/falsity primarily and by-itself and the sentence would be true/false by virtue of it, because a portion of the sentence_ namely the subject_ has not sense, namely before predication we do not have “this sentence”.

Keywords

References

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Philosophy
Volume 18, Issue 1 - Serial Number 34
September 2020
Pages 189-205

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History

  • Receive Date: 02 December 2019
  • Revise Date: 28 May 2020
  • Accept Date: 20 September 2020

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