Philosophy

Abstract The purpose of this article is to compare the approach of Ibn Arabi and Feyerabend in facing the "other" and epistemic confrontations. Despite the background and historical differences of these two thinkers, both of them consider "the other" and epistemic confrontations as an opportunity to upgrade and elevate the epistemological dimensions of a person. Ibn Arabi's and Fayraband's approach to the system of existence is closely related to their view in the field of epistemology. The encounter of these two thinkers with "the other" and different opinions is rooted in their ontological system. In Ibn Arabi's ontological system, the difference between beings is due to the difference between divine names. This existential and ontological difference also finds its way to the field of knowledge and causes a plurality of opinions and ideas. From Feyerabend's point of view, existence is a complex and rich thing, and the possibility of understanding its truth is completely ruled out. In the eyes of both, the possibility of being able to grasp the whole truth from a specific point of view is ruled out. Instead of recommending the elimination of the "other", they recognize multiple opinions and refer to epistemological confrontations as an opportunity to strengthen views and gain a deeper understanding of the truth.

Abstract Light in Iranian intellectual traditions appears as a multilayered ontological principle that shapes truth, inner transformation, and the emergence of meaning. Using Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, this study examines the structure of luminous ascent in Mithraism, Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism, and Khosrowanian wisdom, focusing on how light structures the seeker’s movement toward understanding. The methodology draws on interpretive analysis of philosophical and mystical texts, study of pre-Islamic light-centered traditions, and examination of luminous symbolism in Iranian–Islamic visual culture. The findings indicate a shared pattern of inner transformation across the three traditions: planetary initiation in Mithraism, ascent to the Eighth Climate and the encounter with the Crimson Archangel in Illuminationist thought, and the manifestation of Farr-e Izadi as a sacred radiance that marks existential readiness in Khosrowanian wisdom. Farr-e Izadi emerges not as a mythic motif but as an interpretive event revealing the seeker’s capacity for truth. Through the lens of Gadamer’s concept of horizon, light becomes the condition for meaning to unfold-an experiential field where understanding appears rather than something constructed by the subject. Thus, the Iranian luminous tradition can be understood as an interpretive system in which meaning arises through participation in the luminous order of being and remains open to contemporary hermeneutic reflection.

Abstract John Searle, a contemporary neuroscientist, as one of the most prominent analytical and cognitive philosophers, analyzed the framework of mind and consciousness based on the physical interactions of the brain, that is, nerve firings, and according to her belief, consciousness is the product of the high level of action and reaction of brain neurons, and the nervous structure and its actions are considered the low level of consciousness. According to Searle, one of the most important aspects of consciousness is the aspect of empathy that makes the conscious subject aware and related to the world outside himself. In Searle's philosophy, language is the most fundamental aspect of consciousness. According to him, language has both syntactic (synthetic) and semantic (semantic) characteristics. In order to better understand the language, she discussed speech verbs and language rules, which shows the role of language as the main factor of human communication and the development of consciousness. In order to better understand the language, she discussed speech verbs and language rules, which shows the role of language as the main factor of human communication and the development of consciousness. the conscious subject in order to express mental states, is something that Searle has attention to based on the neurobiological method and offers a new explanation of it based on naturalistic principles. In the current research, we will analyze this problem, how can we reach the semantic concepts of language by relying on Searle's biological, neurological and philosophical teachings about the physical structure of the brain?

Abstract In Hegel’s aesthetics, art is not merely the representation of the Idea, but a moment in which the Idea is actualized in a sensuous and formal configuration. The internal unity of content and form, conceived as the embodiment of the Idea, is the fundamental criterion of artistic authenticity. This study aims to investigate the possibility of realizing this dialectical unity within a novel framework of aesthetic experience. Accordingly, the central question of this article is how, in contemporary interactive art forms, particularly in interactive narratives within video games, the Idea might emerge not through representational form, but through lived and participatory experience. The research adopts a philosophical-conceptual method grounded in dialectical analysis and comparative interpretation, drawing on core Hegelian notions such as Idea, embodiment, negation, necessity in form, and the transition from sense to spirit. The findings suggest that when a work’s form is constructed as temporally extended, nonlinear, and interactive, it can enable a mode of dialectical awareness in which meaning is not pre-given but generated through the subject’s active engagement with form. In certain cases, breakdowns in narrative coherence, structural dissonance, or the absence of language foster philosophical reflection on limits, and this negative truth itself may signify a mode of the Idea’s realization. Thus, Hegelian aesthetics may be conceptually extended to analyze emergent artistic forms without abandoning its foundational principles.

Abstract The mind-body problem remains one of the deepest philosophical issues, examining the relationship between the thinking aspect of human beings and their material basis. Following the introduction of a substantial distinction between mind and matter, this problem evolved into a confrontation between dualism and physicalism, turning the philosophy of mind into a field of profound reflection. Physicalism, which regards all phenomena as material, faces serious challenges in accounting for consciousness, particularly the inadequacy of type-identity theory in explaining the subjective qualities (qualia) of experience. Employing a descriptive-explanatory method and drawing on insights from cognitive neuroscience, this study seeks to recast this longstanding puzzle as an empirical question: How does the brain, as a material entity, give rise to the mind, a constellation of conscious experiences? Type-identity theory, as one of the most prominent reductive physicalist approaches, identifies mental states with neurophysiological processes and offers a framework for explaining consciousness based on the principle of metaphysical simplicity and consistency with causal closure. Nevertheless, the theory proves inadequate when confronted with the subjective qualities of experience, the complexities of multiple realizability, and explanatory gaps. Through a systematic critique of the metaphysical presuppositions of physicalism, the present research highlights the shortcomings of type-identity theory. It emphasizes the need for integrative approaches -including non-reductive physicalism and phenomenological analyses- for a deeper understanding of consciousness. It is expected that this study will contribute to advancing interdisciplinary dialogues in the fields of philosophy of mind and neuroscience.

Abstract This article reinterprets the system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in relation to the history of cybernetics and artificial intelligence, arguing that—contrary to the predominantly negative readings among contemporary philosophers—the possibility and realization of the technological singularity are neither impossible nor foreclosed within a Hegelian framework. The paper claims that the Hegelian system contains fundamental provisions that pave the way for the emergence of machine consciousness and thereby make possible the advent of genuine or singular artificial intelligence. It begins by examining the history of the concept of singularity from von Neumann to Kurzweil and critiques various Hegelian interpretations of artificial intelligence. It then compares second-order cybernetics with Hegel’s dialectical principle in order to restore the conceptual possibility of singularity. Subsequently, through an analysis of the dialectic of means and ends in Hegel’s subjective logic, along with Marx’s critique of it, the article shows that Marx’s critique inadvertently transfers the mystification of the Idea to tools and machines, thereby laying the groundwork for a form of post-human subjectivity. Finally, by analyzing the resistance of the object in light of quantum physics and quantum computing, the paper argues that singularity is not a future-oriented event but rather a dialectical necessity arising from the internalization of negativity within matter. It concludes that singularity inaugurates a “post-human logic” that resolves the tension between technique and self-consciousness through the dialectical unity of tool, end, and consciousness.

Abstract Intuition pumps are intellectual tools with multiple capabilities that can be used to better understand complex philosophical problems and to reveal, question, and correct our common notions and assumptions. In addition, this intellectual tool plays a fundamental role in bridging the gap between abstract philosophical reflections and empirical scientific research. According this method, by presenting scenarios, they engage the audience's imagination and provoke critical thinking and a deep reconsideration of their beliefs on various issues, thereby encouraging deeper exploration of these issues. However, with all the strengths that intuition pumps have, we must be careful in using them; in other words, they should not be considered equivalent to formal logical arguments and rigorous empirical research, but rather as supplementary tools to the standard scientific and philosophical methods. For this reason, Dennett always emphasizes understanding their potential to mislead, using them cautiously, and using criteria to evaluate their results. For Dennett, “turning the knobs,” compatibility with empirical evidence, and avoiding oversimplification are among the criteria for evaluating intuition pumps. Ultimately, by recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of intuition pumps, we can broaden the scope of philosophical methodology and use more possibilities for complex philosophical research and reflection, contribute to bridging the gap between philosophy and empirical science and to greater interaction between the two, and, most importantly, prevent dogmatism and narrow-mindedness by opening the way for constant revision and rethinking. In this research, information is collected by using library resources and the content is presented through a descriptive-analytical approach.

Abstract This paper argues that Bergsonian duration (la durée) is not inherently an internal phenomenon. However, this proposition arises by considering two distinct types of discourse within Bergson’s philosophy: on one hand, his insistence on the metaphysical nature of duration and its irreducibility to any internal or psychological state; and on the other, the undeniable prominence and frequency of references to the ‘inner’, the ‘psyche’, and ‘consciousness’ when he discusses duration. This article resolves this dichotomy by introducing the distinction between privilege and primacy. However, to legitimize speaking of duration in general (not duration in a specific work among Bergson's oeuvre), an initial effort will be made to offer a methodological proposal for a particular reading of the relationship among Bergson's works. Then, based on this proposal, the second effort and the primary finding of the article will be to demonstrate that applying duration to the psyche is of the kind of converted predication (predication by conversion, aks al-haml). Finally, the significance of this finding lies in liberating Bergsonian duration from an interpretive framework that holds both historical and logical precedence over other interpretations: the spiritualistic reading of Bergson. This spiritualistic reading serves as the foundation for two other misinterpretations of Bergson (specifically, naive realism and a form of correlationism). Consequently, demonstrating the falsity of the spiritualistic reading effectively separates Bergsonian duration from all three erroneous readings.

Abstract In Hans Blumenberg's philosophy, metaphor plays a special role and consists in adding logic to metaphor that in turn giving rise to the logic of metaphor. In this philosophy, the logic of metaphor emerges from the history of concepts,, traces the path of concept formation, and ultimately transforms into a fundamental mode of approaching reality. This fundamental mode of approach is the outcome of the logic of metaphor, which,, distinguishes itself from other philosophical approaches, such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. The question is: which critique of the history of concepts makes this logic of metaphor possible?
The critique of the conception of the history of concepts regarding history makes this possible. Here a radical conception of history emerges, according to which history cannot be brought into the present because it is absolutely impassable. This conception of history results from the fact that, instead of following history as a longitudinal section in the history of concepts, we can also consider it as a cross-sectional cut. This cross-sectional cut enables us to discern, in every taking of a stance toward the world, which negation that stance has incorporated within itself. Blumenberg calls such work typology and, through it, measures the power of the logic of metaphor as an approach.
Ultimately, the logic of metaphor establishes itself as an approach, with regard to language, in a formulated and distinctive manner that attends to the excess of language over meaning. This understanding is rooted in the rhetorical knowledge's comprehension of language.

Abstract The nature of self-awareness remains a fundamental question in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and the philosophy of language. Although commonly defined as the subject’s awareness of itself, this notion conceals profound conceptual and ontological challenges that have preoccupied philosophers from Hegel to Wittgenstein. The enduring question is whether self-awareness should be viewed as a purely mental reflection or as something that arises within and through language itself. This paper advances the thesis that self-awareness is not merely a mental state but a linguistic event. What we call the awareness of the self is, at a deeper level, the manifestation of language’s reflexive capacity to describe and interpret its own operations. In this view, self-awareness emerges when language becomes capable of turning its own structure and function into the content of discourse, thus transforming language from a communicative tool into a self-reflective medium. While a wide range of philosophical traditions—from Hegelian dialectics and Husserlian intentionality to Islamic mysticism and later linguistic theories—have examined self-awareness, most have overlooked the constitutive role of language in enabling self-reflection. This study seeks to illuminate this neglected dimension through a polyphonic philosophical dialogue, demonstrating that self-awareness can be conceived as the reflexive act of language upon itself. Furthermore, this perspective outlines an objective framework for the experimental investigation of self-awareness, suggesting that by grounding the phenomenon in linguistic mechanisms, the study of consciousness may move from a subjective domain toward an empirically testable and objective field of inquiry.

Abstract In Aristo-Avicennan logic, a distinction is made between the matter and modality of propositions. This distinction is not very clear in Aristotle's works, and although Al-Fārābī made the distinction between matter and modality, his distinction is neither stated nor defined clearly. Unlike these two great teachers of logic, however, in the Avicennan tradition, there are at least two clear but different approaches to the distinction between matter and modality: (1) Avicenna explicitly considers modality as verbal and defines matter as a non-verbal "state of the predicate in relation to the subject," or in other words, the modality is signifying. (2) Suhrawardī, however, considers matter to be the proposition itself without modality or without modality and negation. Logicians between Avicenna and Suhrawardī, such as Al-Ghazālī and Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, sometimes had ambiguous approaches that were probably not without influence in the formation of Suhrawardī's approach. This article provides a critical account of these two approaches. Since Muslim logicians after Suhrawardī, influenced by these two approaches, have presented very conflicting views on the distinction between matter and modality, and since the examination and criticism of their views far exceed the scope of one article, I have devoted a critical examination of their views and my final analysis of the history of developments on this subject to another article in this field.

Abstract The informational theory of knowledge is a theory proposed by Luciano Floridi in response to the failure of the tripartite definition of knowledge - "justified true belief" - in solving the Gettier problem. Based on the concept of semantic information, Floridi claims that his theory has succeeded in resolving the Gettier problem. Regardless of whether it has achieved its goal, Floridi's theory has provided a plausible explanation of the process of knowledge formation. One of Floridi's significant innovations in the theory is his view on "epistemic relevance," which demonstrates that knowledge is a label ascribed to semantic information relevant to the epistemic agent. In this article, while addressing the issue of epistemic relevance, we introduce various types of relevance—including subjective and objective—and by presenting a model for Gettier cases, we will show that "subjective relevance" is the main factor in the formation of these cases. Moreover, by reinterpreting the Gettier problem within the informational theory as the "problem of objective relevance," we will argue that the way to overcome this problem in the informational theory is to identify objectively relevant information. Subsequently, by introducing the "network theory of account" as the final condition for attaining knowledge, we examine Floridi's proposed solution to the Gettier problem, considering it an attempt to identify objective relevance. Finally, we critically evaluate Floridi's claim of having solved the Gettier problem and demonstrate that the network theory of account operates in a subjective manner and cannot achieve the identification of objective relevance.

Abstract This research investigates the philosophical intersection between Baruch Spinoza’s “Ethics of Joy” and the aesthetics of the sublime in Ann Radcliffe’s Gothic novels. It posits that Spinoza’s conception of joy—defined as a transition from passivity to activity and an increase in “ontological power”—provides a critical framework for understanding how Radcliffe’s characters engage with nature and music. While the Gothic sublime is traditionally associated with terror and the dissolution of the subject, this study argues that Radcliffe reconfigures this experience into one of “epistemic liberation.”Through the lens of Spinozist thought, the sublime in Radcliffe’s work is not a source of mere dread, but a transformative encounter that facilitates a connection to the totality of existence (Substance). By navigating through overwhelming natural landscapes and profound musical experiences in her novels , characters undergo a movement from the terror of the unknown toward a rational understanding of nature’s hidden order.This process mirrors Spinoza’s path to perfection, where the transition from passive affects (fear)to active understanding (joy) is achieved through intellectual intuition. Ultimately, the study suggests that music and nature affect the characters and act as metaphysical mediators, resolving internal conflicts and guiding characters toward a state of lasting harmony, peace, and Spinozistic joy.

Abstract امانوئل کانت در سنجش خردناب با تحدید عقل نظری،شناخت ذهنی ازجهان راحاصل مساهمت فعالانۀ تجربه ومفاهیم دانسته وبه عبارتی هر پدیداری را محصول چنین سازوکاری درذهن فاعل شناسا تبیین می‌کند.درسه‌گانه انتقادی،کانت درنقدسوم است که به داوری زیبا وحکم دربارۀ آن می‌پردازد.یکی از اهداف وی در تقریر نقد سوم تحقق کلیت و اعتبار همگانی چنین حکمی در عین سوبژکتیو بودن آن است.بازنگری تبیین کانت در باب حکم ذوقی،امکان جدیدی درسنجش زیباشناسی فلسفی فناوری‌های عصر حاضر فراهم می‌آورد.هوش‌مصنوعی یکی از برجسته‌ترین و اثرگذارترین نتایج فناوری نوین است که با بهره‌گیری ازسازه‌ها ومعماری‌های گوناگون درحال شبیه‌‌سازی و فراروی ازتوانایی‌های شناختی انسان دربیشتر حوزه‌ها هست.لیکن درافق معاصر و با فرارفتن و تغییر افق‌های پیشین معرفت‌شناسی،لزوم بازاندیشی زمینه‌ی‌های فلسفی براساس همان بنیادهایی که ذهن انسان در کارکرد خود بر آن‌ها مبتنی است،زمینۀ پرسش‌های فلسفی درباب اشتراکاتش با این هوش نوبنیاد را مهیا می‌سازد.بالاخص بازسنجی مطابقت سازوکار داوری ذهن انسان دربارۀ احکام صادره از سوی آن بیش از پیش مطرح می‌شود.از این رو پژوهش حاضر می‌کوشد درجهت بازکاوی عملکرد قوای ذهن انسانی و سیستم‌های هوش‌مصنوعی در صدور حکم زیبا بر مبنای افق کانتی و بررسی شاخصه‌های این فناوری جدید گام بردارد و با تبیین عملکردهوش‌مصنوعی درمواجهه با زیبا بربنیاددستگاه فکری کانت که همچنان یکی از زیرساخت‌های معرفتی انسان معاصر و پس از آن است، به تحلیل و تطبیق عملکردهای منطقی زیباشناختی درعصرجدید ‌بپردازد. بنابراین این تحقیق هم‌سنجی مفهومی ادراک زیبایی در سامانه‌های هوش مصنوعی و ساختار حکم تأملی زیباشناسی در نظام داوری ذوقی کانت و منافات احتمالی این دو حوزه را مورد استدلال قرار می‌دهد.

Abstract At the beginning of Being and Time, Bergson's name comes alongside Aristotle’s name when Heidegger tried to distinguish the concept of temporality from traditional time. Now, the question is why after Aristotle, the name of Bergson comes? If he meant to name the last philosopher, why didn’t he mention Husserl, who was Heidegger’s professor and was supposed to have a lecture about Time-consciousness? Why not Hegel, whose interpretation of the concept of time is the subject of the penultimate chapter in Being and Time? Why not Dilthey, whose thoughts are the focus of Heidegger’s most critical early investigations of time? However, in the footnote near the end of Being and Time, Heidegger admits that he only wanted to distinguish his thoughts from Bergson about the concept of time. But our investigations show something different. It shows that Heidegger used Bergson’s concept of time to build his theory in Being and Time. Although, recently, researchers gave a great interest to Bergson's work and his influences on Gilles Deleuze's philosophy, but the questions about Bergson's influence on phenomenology and Heidegger's philosophy had been unanswered. The increasing attention of scholars toward these questions is promising, but not enough. This article tries to answer some of these questions.

Abstract Explanation of the relationship between soul and body is one of the most important concerns of Dualist philosophers. Even though the Dualism goes back to Plato, Rene Descartes, a French philosopher, has considerable contribution on explanation, modification or, in some senses, correction of this theory. These contributions was to the extent that sometimes such thoughts are referred to as Platonic-Descartian dualism. The most challenging subject of this theory is to explain that how soul and body communicate. Descartes introduces the pineal gland, the small gland in the middle of the brain, as the "seat of the soul" where body and soul are interacting. The aim of this paper is to explain the role and the importance of pineal gland through the history of philosophy especially through Descartes philosophy. For this reason, at first the historical context of the importance of pineal gland is studied and then viewpoints of Descartes about the gland, based on his works, are explained.

Abstract This paper presents the most important features of Peirce's semiotics, including the emergence process of signs, their ways of signifying, as well as their practical dimensions. The study of Peirce's three philosophical categories as well as the issue of "abduction" underlines the central role of Peirce's semiotics in his ontology and in his epistemology, in such a way that all thoughts and all kinds of process of signification can be considered to be stemming from his conception of signs. According to Peirce, signs are the structure of all thoughts and on this basis, life of every king of knowledge and even the relations between human beings depend on signs. In this regard, a brief comparative study between Peirce's three categories and the different kinds of perceptions in Islamic philosophy is also mentioned.
As a means of analysis of human thoughts and their practical consequences, Peirce's semiotics has also a pragmatist dimension, even though we can not consider him to be a strict follower of pragmatism. Peirce's semiotics has been used in various fields including philosophy of media, arts… In this context, one of the practical applications of his semiotics in the interpretation of a work of art is also tackled.

Abstract Aesthetics, nowadays, is regarded as a branch of philosophy which studies  Beauty and art. This research is about aesthetics from Mulla Sadra's viewpoint. In the works of this philosopher, Beauty in general means  possessing all the good properties. The special definition of beauty, which includes only sensible objects, is possessing the factors of order, good combination, moderation, and so on. According Mulla Sadra's viewpoint the origin of beauty is absolute beautiful, although their interpretations are different. Creating pleasure and love and wonder are some of the consequences of beauty on the rcipient soul. According to him, beauty is an objective thing, although it may have a stable existence in conception. According to Mulla Sadra, some of the origins of art are manifestation of some  of God's names, inclination to beauty, love of beauty, revelation, relation with transcendental world, imitative image and so on. Imitative image is According to Mulla Sadra, imagination is  the first origin of the work of art.. Mulla Sadra believes in the imaginary world to which people relate through sleep and mystics through divine inspiration. People and mysticy can realize what they have observed in that world into art and create works of art. This Muslim philosopher has also discussed  poetry as a kind of work of art.    

Abstract Descartes' absolutist rationalism makes a gap between human perception and the physical word. As a result, there will be a separation between his rational approach to the word and that of sensory-emotional. Now, the problem is that whether there is any place for beauty and aestheticism in the Cartesian rationalism. In this paper, we will deal with sense and sensory perception in Descartes rationalism, the place of aestheticism in his Philosophical system and the question that whether it is possible to have a reliable knowledge of beauty on such a basis. The basis of Cartesian philosophy is on “I think therefore I am” and subjectivism, as a result of this principle, is an absolutely new concept at the center of his philosophical system. This is a viewpoint in cognitive, ethical, pragmatic, aesthetic and artistic areas in which the basis is on subject, the doer of an ethical act, a judge of aestheticism and the creator of an artistic creation. Hence, the question is: what is the relations between aestheticism and subjectivism as one of the essential and important issues in western philosophy 'in the modern era'. After briefly going through the classical aestheticism of Plato and beauty in the context of Descartes’ subjectivism, this paper adopts a comparative approach to argue that Descartes, as the father of modern philosophy, would revolutionize the philosophy of art and aestheticism, influenced by Plato, by a different interpretation of existence, reality and knowledge. Based on this view, we can recognize him as the founder of modern philosophy and a estheticism.  

Abstract This article is an attempt to show that how the meanings of the words “philosophy” and “philosopher” change in Plato’s Phaedo in comparison with his early Socratic dialogues. The Phaedo is Plato’s interpretation of Socrates’ life, philosophy and death, in light of Orphic and Pythagorean eschatological doctrines. In this interpretation, Plato reveals his problem of epistemological pessimism and proposes its solution. He regards Socrates as the ideal philosopher, being aware of his own ignorance and the epistemic obstacles of this world, becomes capable to purify his soul from the human and corporeal concerns and make the soul ready for flying out of its bodily prison, so that the soul could gain pure knowledge in the supreme and divine realm of immateriality. Thus, Plato provides his own definitions of the words “philosophy” and “philosopher” in the Phaedo, according to which “philosophy” is the way of purification and salvation of the soul, and the “philosopher” is the one who is willingly training for dying in order to release his soul from confines of the mundane world in search of pure knowledge.    

Abstract   In the tradition of philosophy Prime matter has been often accepted as a genuine Aristotelian concept. However, this has been doubted by some modern scholars. The dispute is mainly whether Aristotle committed to prime matter or not. On the other hand, some scholars still endorse prime matter as a part of Aristotle’s philosophy. Prime matter is tied up to the problem of generation. Generation, in a sense is “absolute becoming”, i.e. not “becoming something”, whereas the general analysis of change indicates that in all becoming something remains. It is on this aporia that prime matter plays its role. Prime matter seems to be able to solve the difficulty and we can maintain both that generation is absolute becoming and that something remains in the course of generation. Moreover the replacement of one element with another one can’t be explained without prime matter, because there is nothing prior to the elements i.e. to water, air, fire and earth, to be as the secondary matter. In this article, explaining the relation between matter and form, I have tried to clarify the meaning of “matter remaining” in the course of generation, and “combination of matter and form” in sensible substances. In this analysis, the concept of “potentiality” has a central role. When potentiality actualizes, then there is no potentiality, although this present actuality is the actualization of that potentiality. In the same manner, when we say a matter gets a new form, it means that the matter which was an indeterminate thing becomes form and determinate. Accordingly, the combination of matter and form means that each material substance happens “from” a certain subject and reaches an end, and the matter remaining means that this certain matter, and not any other one, has changed into the form, but it doesn’t mean something endures in the course of the process of generation. If this interpretation of remaining and combination is accepted, there will be no room for prime matter.