عنوان مقاله [English]
Abstract: Here, I will introduce a totality of a view about “the concept of an object in general” in the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to do so, I will articulate an article under the title of Generality of Kant’s transcendental logic since the article has presented the view adequately and in an uninterrupted way. Alongside with this articulation, I will purpose a consideration about this totality: As we will see, the fundamental characteristic of the totality of this view is to concentrate on determining the status of “transcendental logic sensu stricto” as (1) a necessarily “non-formal logic” that (2) still stays “universal”. Thus, transcendental logic can be proposed as a transcendental “universal ontology” which its subject matter is “the concept of an object in general”. based on this view, in order to set these two conditions, we must abstract transcendental logic from any relation to any level of “transcendental aesthetics in general” and “intuition in general”. The hint to this abstraction is the principle that “transcendental logic sensu stricto” can only be achieved at the level of “reason in general” and any reference to the level of “critique” of “reason in general” would already dysfunction the transcendental logic itself. Through a consideration, I will attempt to discuss this subject that to what extent the abovementioned view, with its omitting of the level of “critique of pure reason” from transcendental logic, stays loyal to “the idea of a transcendental logic” in Critique of Pure Reason.