نفس و اختلالات عصبی- روانی؛ تبیینی نوخاسته‌گرایانه و صدرایی

عبادی, احمد; عموسلطانی فروشانی, محمدمهدی

doi:10.22059/jop.2021.316712.1006580

نوع مقاله : علمی -پژوهشی

نویسندگان

¹ دانشیار فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان

² پژوهشگر پسادکترای فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان

https://doi.org/10.22059/jop.2021.316712.1006580

چکیده

انواع آسیب‌های مغزی و عصبی (از جمله اختلال هویت تجزیه‌ای، اسکیزوفرنی، تغییرات خُلقی و مانند آن) بر تباه‌شدن و دگرگون‌شدن ِکیفیاتِ حیاتی، حالاتِ ذهنی و شخصیتی، و حتی انگارۀ نفس و «خود» تأثیر مستقیم دارد. مشاهدۀ این تأثیرات، دستاویز نظریات گوناگونی دربارة وجودِ نفس و مفارقت‌پذیری آن (از نفی وجود خود/ذهن/نفس و یا نفی تجرد خود/ذهن/نفس تا نفیِ بقای نفس مجرد آن) شده است. چارچوب نظری و مفهومی نوخاستهگرایی و حکمت متعالیه، قابلیتی دارد که می‌توان از آن در تجزیه و تحلیل این مسئله بهره برد و نگاهی فراتر از ابزارگراییِ دوگانهانگاران، به‌عنوان یک راهکار کلی دربارة تأثیر اختلالات عصبیِ فیزیکی بر نفسِ مجرد ارائه داد. با اذعان به نوخاسته‌گرایی جوهری و همسوبودن آن با نظریۀ جسمانیة‌الحدوث صدرایی، و عبور از دیدگاه نوخاسته‌گرایی ویژگی‌های صرف، می‌توان گفت که بدن و دستگاه پیچیدة عصبی بر اساس میزان تکامل و پیچیدگی‌اش، موجب نوخاستگیِ (حدوث) مراتبی از نفس (از نوخاستگی مرتبة گیاهی تا مرتبة وجود لنفسه و خودآیین) و نوخاستگیِ ویژگی‌های حیاتی، ذهنی و روانی متناسب می‌شود. به سبب این همبستگی و تعامل علّیِ نوخاسته‌گرایانه، انواع آسیب‌های عصبی، مادامی‌که نفسِ انسان در مرتبه نباتی، تعلق ذاتی به بدن دارد و در مرتبۀ تجرد جوهری، تعلق عارضی به بدن دارد، موجب نوخاستگیِ اختلالات روانی به‌عنوان ویژگی‌های مختل‌کننده برای جوهر نفس و نیز فروخفتگیِ برخی ویژگی‌های ذهنیِ نوخاسته می‌شود؛ بدون آنکه وجودِ بسیط، لنفسه، خودآیین و مفارقت‌پذیرِ نفس نفی و تباه شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Soul and Mental-Neurological Disorders (An Emergentist and Sadraian Explanation)

نویسندگان [English]

Ahmad Ebadi ¹
Mohammadmahdi Amoosoltani Forooshani ²

¹ Associate professor in Islamic philosophy and theology, University of Isfahan

² Postdoctoral researcher of philosophy and islamic theology, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

چکیده [English]

All kinds of brain damages and neurological disorders (including dissociative identity, schizophrenia, mood swings, etc.) affect the loss and transformation of biotic qualities, mental states, and even the idea of the soul and "self". Observing these effects leads to the development of various theories about the existence of the soul and its detachability (from the negation of self/mind/soul, or denial of its immateriality up to rejection of its surviving. The theoretical framework of emergentism and Mulla Sadra's wisdom help to analyze this challenge and to provide a superior theory to dualistic instrumentalism as a general approach to the problem of neurological disorders' effect on the soul. By attention to two types of emergentism (substance emergentism and property emergentism), and Mulla Sadra’s theory of the “Bodily Origination” we may tell that the body and the nervous system give rise to the hierarchical emergence of the soul (from the vegetative to the self-subsistent mind/soul) and all the proper biotic and mental properties. Under this emergentist correlation of body and soul, and due to intrinsic belonging of soul to the body at the vegetative level and accidental belonging at the substantial and autonomous level of the soul's existence, brain damages and neurological disorders give rise to the emergence of mental disorders as the disruptive properties for the soul as well as submerging of some of the mental emergent properties, without the devastation of the self-subsistent and autonomous existence of the soul.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

Soul
Mind
Neurological-mental Disorders
Emergentism
Bodily Origination

مراجع

آشتیانى، سید جلال‌الدین (1381)، شرح بر زادالمسافر، قم، بوستان کتاب‏.

ابن‌سینا (1379)، الاشارات و التنبیهات، ج2، تهران، الحیدری.

ملاصدرا (1368)، الحکمة المتعالیة فی الأسفار العقلیة الأربعة، ج1-5 و 8-9، چ2، قم، مکتبة المصطفوی.

ـــــــــ (1354)، المبدأوالمعاد، تهران، انجمن حکمت و فلسفۀ ایران.

Allman, J. M. & et al. (2005), “Intuition and Autism: A Possible Role for Von Economo Neurons”, Trends in Cognitive Science, no. 8, 367–373.

Archinov, Vladimir & Fuchs, Christian (2003), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation, Moscow, NIA-Priroda.

Bear, M., Connors, B. & Paradiso, M. (2007). Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain, 3rd edn. Philadelphia:Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

Beckermann, A., Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (1992), Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism, New York, Walter de Gruyter.

Bergonzi, M., Luisi P.L. (2017), “The Consciousness of Space, the Space of Consciousness”, Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding, The Frontiers Collection, Wuppuluri, S., Ghirardi, G. (Eds.), Springer, Cham.

Black, D.M. (2004), “A Fact without Parallel: Consciousness as an Emergent Property”, Brit. J. Psychother, 21(1), 69-82.

Blackmore, S. (2006), Conversations on Consciousness: What the best minds think about brain, free will, and what it means to be human, Oxford: Oxford University.

Bovet, P. & Parnas, J. (1993), “Schizophrenic delusions: A phenomenological approach”, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 19 (3), 579–597.

Camazine, S. & et al. (2001), Self-organization in biological systems, Princeton, Princeton University.

Carruthers, P. (1996), “Autism as mind-blindness: An elaboration and partial defence”, In: Theories of Mind, Carruthers P., Smith P. (Eds.), , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 257-274.

Colvin, M. & et al. (2017), “Split‐brain Cases”, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Velmans, Max & Schneider, Susan (Eds.), New York, Wiley-Blackwell.

Dennett, D. C. (1991), Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.

Farah, M. (2008), “Neuroethics and the problem of other minds: implications of neuroscience for the moral status of brain-damaged patients and nonhuman animals”, Neuroethics 1, 9–18.

Feinberg, Todd E. & Julian Paul Keenan. (2005), “Where in the brain is the self?”, Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 661–678.

Forstmann, M., & Burgmer, P. (2017), “Antecedents, manifestations, and consequences of belief in mind-body dualism”, In Zedelius C. M., Müller B. C. N., & Schooler, J. W. (Eds.), The science of lay theories: How beliefs shape our cognition, behavior, and health, Springer International Publishing AG, 181–205.

Francesco, M.D. (2007), “Extended Cognition and the Unity of Mind. Why We are Not 'Spread into the World”, Cartographies of the Mind, Studies in Brain and Mind, Marraffa, M., Caro, M.D., Ferretti, F. (Eds.), vol 4, Springer, Dordrecht, 211-225.

Gennaro, Rocco J. )2018), “Consciousness and Psychopathology”, The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, Gennaro, Rocco J. (Ed.), New York: Routledge, 337-350.

ـــــــــــــــــــــ (2019), “The Neuroscience of Psychiatric Disorders and the Metaphysics of Consciousness”, In: Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update, Gargiulo, P., Mesones, A. H. (Eds.), Springer, Cham.

Goodman, Lenne & Caramenico, d. (2013), Coming to Mind, The Soul and Its Body, Chicago, University of Chicago.

Graham, George (2010), The disordered mind: an introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge.

Hasker, William (1999), The emergent self, Ithaka/London, Cornell University Press.

Hasker, W. (2011), “Souls Beastly and Human”, In: The soul hypothesis, Baker, Mark, Stewart Goetz. New York, Continuum.

ـــــــــــــــــــــ (2015), “Why Emergence?”, In: The Routledge Companion to Theological Anthropology, Farris, Joshua R. & Taliaferro Charles (Eds.), New York, Routledge.

Harlow, John Martyn (1868), “Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar through the Head”, Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society, 2, 327–347.

Johnson, D. (2013), “Do souls exist?”, Think, 12(35), 61-75.

Kandel, Eric R. (2018), The Disordered Mind, What Unusual Brains Tell Us About Ourselves, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kelly, E. F. & et al. (2007), Irreducible mind: Toward a psychology for the 21st century, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

Libet, Benjamin (2004), Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

McTaggart, John (1906), Some Dogmas of Religion, London, Edward Arnold, 106-110.

Majorek, M. B. (2012), “Does the brain cause conscious experience?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(3–4), 121–144.

Maritain, Jacques. (1952), The Range of Reason, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Maskulak, Marian (2007), Edith Stein and the Body-Soul-Spirit at the Center of Holistic Formation, New York, P. Lang.

Menon, Sangeetha (2014), Brain self and consciousness: Explaining the conspiracy of experience, Springer, New Delhi.

Musacchio, J. M. (2012), Contradictions: Neuroscience and religion, Berlin, Springer-Verlag Publishing.

Peacocke, Christopher (2014), The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University.

Pinto, Y. & et al. (2017a), “Split brain: divided perception but undivided consciousness”, Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237.

ـــــــــــــــــــــ, de Haan EHF, Lamme VAF. (2017b), “The Split-Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Nov, 21(11), 835-851.

Proust, J. (2006), “Agency in schizophrenia from a control theory viewpoint”, In: Disorders of Volition, N. Sebanz and W. Prinz (Eds.), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 87-118.

Sadock, B. J., Sadock, V. A. & Ruiz, P. (2015), Kaplan & Sadock's synopsis of psychiatry: Behavioral sciences/clinical psychiatry (Eleventh edition.), Philadelphia, Wolters Kluwer.

Strawson, G. (1997), “The self”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, 405–28.

Swinburne, Richard (2004), “The Possibility of Life after Death”, In: Cave, Peter & Brendan Larvor (Eds.), Thinking About Death, British Humanist Association, 38-42.

Reid, T. (1896), Inquiry into the Human Mind, Collected in The Works of Thomas Reid. Edinburg: MacLachlan, Stewart.

Robinson, Daniel N. (2011), “Minds, Brains, and Brains in Vats”, In: The soul hypothesis, Baker, Mark & Goetz, Stewart, New York, Continuum, 46-67.

Rousseau, David (2011), “Near-Death Experiences and the Mind-Body Relationship: A Systems- Theoretical Perspective”, Journal of Near-Death Studies. 29.

Runehov, A. L. C. (2016), The human being, the world and God: Studies at the interface of philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind and neuroscience, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing.

Taylor, M. A. (1999), The Fundamentals of Clinical Neurology, New York, Oxford University Press.

نفس و اختلالات عصبی- روانی؛ تبیینی نوخاسته‌گرایانه و صدرایی

مراجع

مراجع

دوره 19، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 36تیر 1400صفحه 173-196

دوره 19، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 36
تیر 1400
صفحه 173-196