عنوان مقاله [English]
There are three mainstreams in feminist philosophy of science: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodern epistemology. Sandra Harding as a feminist philosopher of science aims to integrate standpoint theory with postmodern tendencies. This tendency is apparent in her account about scientific pluralism. One can recognize two distinct routes in Harding’s arguments for scientific pluralism. First; she argues for some kind of scientific pluralism which is based on the concept of "strong objectivity" and second; she establishes an argument in favor of a "world of sciences" which reflects post-modern concerns. The strong objectivity argument relies on standpoint theory of knowledge. It assumed that the perspectives of marginal groups can produce less distorted accounts about nature and social relations. On the other hand, the concept of the world of sciences is affected by Harding’s postmodern tendencies; according to which there is a co-constitutive relation between science and society. Harding applies both approaches in favor of scientific pluralism, but these two arguments lead to two different types of scientific pluralism. This disparity is the result of the conflicts between standpoint theory of knowledge and postmodern epistemology. In the following paper non-coherent implications of Harding’s scientific pluralism is discussed in two cases: the problem of “Realism/Anti-Realism” and the style of “social interactions in scientific community”.