اکسل هونت و نزاع برای به‌رسمیت‌شناسی در سطح خانواده: چالش‌ها و محدودیت‌ها

نوع مقاله : علمی-ترویجی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ دانشگاه تهران

2 استادیار گروه فلسفۀ دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

گرچه نظریـۀ به‌رسمیت‌‌شناسی اکسل هونت، فیلسوف پیش‌گام نسل سوم مکتب فرانکفورت، در مجموع نظریه‌ای دیگرپذیر تلقی شده، اما در سال‌های اخیر با انتقادات بسیاری مبنی بر ایدئولوژیکی بودن و عدم پذیرش راستین دیگری در درون ساختار خود مواجه شده است. با وجود این ، بسیاری از این انتقادات تنها به سطوح دوم و سوم به‌رسمیت‌‌شناسی معطوف بوده‌اند؛ چراکه کنش سیاسی و رهایی‌بخش از نظر هونت، تنها در این سطوح ممکن است. در نتیجـۀ چنین امری، نهاد خانواده و سطح نخست به‌رسمیت‌‌شناسی همواره دارای منطق درونی مستقل، پیشاسیاسی و با مخمصه‌های ایدئولوژیکی متفاوت با دیگر سطوح فرض شده است؛ اما این مقاله می‌کوشد تا صورت‌بندی متفاوتی از سطح اول به‌رسمیت‌شناسی و معضلات آن ارائه دهد؛ صورت‌بندی‌ای که ضمن نگاهی متفاوت و واقع‌ گرایانه‌‌تر به رابطـۀ والد و فرزند، به بازتولید ساختارهای سلطه در اجتماع نیز توجه جدی کند. بدین ترتیب، مقاله از طریق بررسی مخمصه‌های ایدئولوژیکی مطرح‌شده از سوی منتقدان، استدلال می‌کند که ضرورت دارد هم مخمصۀ مورد بحث و هم راه حل‌های احتمالی خروج از آن به‌نحوی در هم تنیده و در ربط درونی با سطوح سه‌گانه نظریۀ هونت پیش رود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Axel Honneth and the Struggle for Recognition in the Sphere of Family: Challenges and Limitations

نویسندگان [English]

  • Yasamin Makui 1
  • Hossein Mesbahian 2
1 PhD Student of Philosophy, University of Tehran
2 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Tehran
چکیده [English]

The ethical and political thinking of Axel Honneth—German philosopher and leading scholar in the third generation of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists—is considered an inclusive theory that accepts the other. Honneth attempts to present a theory that is neither too abstract so that no conception of "good life" can endure, nor is too thick and substantive, and thus exclusionary. He attempts to demonstrate a theory in the middle.  However, his theory has also been subject to the criticism that it rests on an ideological and exclusionary basis. Nevertheless, most such criticisms have their root in the entanglement of the second and third spheres of recognition and thus accept Honneth’s distinction between private and public life, according to which the former contains an immanent and pre-political logic. As a result, except for a few feminist philosophers, criticisms of ideological recognition are confined to the second and third spheres, respectively the realm of human rights and societal solidarity. By contrast, this article explores the ideological predicaments of the first sphere of recognition—familial love—by rejecting the private-public distinction and advocating for broader love-based recognition. Eliminating this distinction will help Honneth's account of the first sphere of recognition to consider the asymmetrical power plays and ideological predicaments between family members.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Axel Honneth
  • Recognition
  • Family Institution
  • Private and Public Life
  • Ideology
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