تحلیل و نقد تقویمِ اگویِ دیگر در پدیدارشناسی هوسرل

نوع مقاله : علمی -پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ معاصر، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه بین‎المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران.

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران.

چکیده

این مقاله قصد دارد تا رهیافت هوسرل در تقویم دیگری، به‌مثابه اگوی دیگر را، مورد بررسی و تحلیل قرار دهد. آنچه از بیان هوسرل در تأمل پنجم تأملات دکارتی برمی‌آید، تقویم دیگری به‌عنوان آغازی برای پی‌ریزی جهانی است که در آن، عینیت و ابژکتیویته، برای همه در دسترس باشد. هوسرل این جهان را بیناسوبژکتیو نام می‌نهد. روایت هوسرل از این تقویم، شامل دو گام اساسی است: در گام نخست، تقلیل دوم به‌اجرا گذارده می‌شود که به‌واسطه آن، از تمامی قصدیت‌ها، انگیزه‌ها، معانی و جز آن، معطوف به دیگرانِ غیر از من، قطع‌نظر می‌شود. سپس با بیان مشخصه ادراک دیگری به‌مثابه یک حضور غیر مستقیم، معنای دیگری در یک ادراک غیرمستقیم شبیه‌ساز و به‌واسطه یک انتقال معنایی در فرآیند جفت‌وجورسازی، از بدن من به بدن دیگری منتقل می‌شود. دست‌کم می‌توان سه نقد جدی بر این توصیف وارد ساخت: 1. اپوخه دوم، تمامی معناهای معطوف به دیگری را از اگو سلب می‌کند و بنابراین، هرگونه ارجاعی به دیگری که بناست معنایش را از اگو دریافت کند، منتفی است؛ 2. توصیف هوسرل از بدن، بسیاری از جوانب درباره آن را مغفول می‌گذارد؛ و حتی در نقطه آغاز، تفاوت ادراکی میان ادراک بدنِ من وبدن دیگری را مورد ملاحظه قرار نمی‌دهد؛ 3. بیان هوسرل برای تمیز میان ارگانیسم و شبه‌ارگانیسم، نا روشن، مبهم و نابسنده است. بیان عباراتی مبهم مانند رفتار متغیر اما هماهنگ، و نیز عدم ارائه معیاری برای تشخیص رفتار هماهنگ یک ارگانیسم، از مواردی است که توصیف هوسرل را دچار دشواری می‌کند.    

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Analysis and Investigation of the Constitution of the Alter Ego in Husserl's Phenomenology

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohamadmehdi Moghadas 1
  • Masood Seif 2
1 PhD Student of Philosophy at IKIU Qazvin, Faculty of Literature and Humanity Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.
2 Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanity Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.
چکیده [English]

 
This article proposes of analyzing and investigating Husserl's approach to other’s constitutions, as alter ego. What emerges from Husserl's statement in the fifth meditation of Cartesian meditations is the other’s constitution as a commencement for the foundation of a world in which objectivity is available to all. Husserl calls this world intersubjective. Husserl's account of this constitution includes two basic steps: In the first step, the second reduction implements, by which all intentions, motivations, meanings, etc., aimed at others other than me, are neglected. Then, by expressing the character of the other’s perception as an indirect presence, the meaning of the other is transferred from my body to the other’s body, through an assimilative apperception and by a meaning transfer in the pairing process. At least three serious criticisms can make of this description: (1) The second epoché removes all the meanings directed at the other from the ego. Therefore, any reference to the other that is supposed to acquire its meaning from the ego excludes. In the transcendental sphere, the second epoché takes place by abstracting from everything gives to me as something other than myself; therefore, what remains after the execution of this epoché is only "I." In the second epoché, everything that concerns explicitly I leaves me in what Husserl calls "the special sphere of ownness." This reduction includes the decision only to consider what belongs to me; therefore, to find how "I" gives meaning to the subjects who are bodies as perceptual objects belonging to this reduced sphere of "ownness" and also to discover those capacities that transcended as subjects, this reduction implements. (2) Husserl's description of the body leaves out many aspects of it, And even at the starting point, it does not consider the perceptual difference between the perception of my body and the body of others. He emphasizes the claim that a person's own body is uniquely separated from other animal and human bodies. A person may be supposed to experience this body as an organism when he attributes to its feelings, perceptions, and meaningful actions. Husserl's description of a person's experience of his own body seems to be a particularly limited experience, because Husserl fails to explain the vast part of physical experiences that are known as experiences beyond one's control. Such descriptions of the body seem to be more suitable for mechanical beings that rely on the governance and control of the body.(3) Husserl's statement to distinguish between organism and pseudo-organism is unclear, obscure, and unsatisfactory. Expressing ambiguous terms such as variable but harmonious behavior, as well as not providing a criterion to recognize the harmonious behavior of an organism, are among the things that make Husserl's description difficult. First, in this type of reasoning, it is usually not clear how much improvisation - that is, how many observers apart from the revealed other - is needed to ensure a sufficient number of cases of harmonious behavior. Second, it is also unclear what one should do when faced with another person without having the opportunity to observe their behavior several times. That is, it is unclear to what extent single behaviors or limited behaviors can demonstrate the criterion of behavior harmony.As a conclusion, regarding (1), (2) and (3), despite Husserl's remarkable insights, suggest that the constitution of alter ego appears to have problems that are far from being resolved.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Alter ego
  • Other
  • Transcendental phenomenology
  • Edmund Husserl
  • Constitution
  • Intentionality
  • Intersubjectivity
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